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TAX VALUATION OF MINNESOTA IRON ORE
DAVID R. ROBERTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
A producing state's policies as to mine taxes and its tax valua-
tion methods become focal points of legislative and legal controversy
in an economy of full production or war preparedness. Business
decisions whether to invest new capital in beneficiation of marginal
Lake Superior iron ores or to undertake extensive exploration
and development of foreign deposits are influenced by present and
prospective tax burdens." While questions of tax rates and inci-
dence of mine taxation are left to the legislature under the Minne-
sota Constitution,2 procedural problems of valuation and assessment
center about four issues which should properly engage the
attention of courts: the structure and constitutionality of the mineral
valuation statutes; standards and methods of valuation as admin-
istratively applied; remedies available for allegedly incorrect as-
sessments; and the availability of judicial review of valuations.
Of the economic interests involved in Minnesota tax controver-
*,Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. See Fortune, Dec. 1948, p. 115 for a major promotion of foreign
iron ores, viz., Labrador ores to be hauled 350 miles to the St. Lawrence
and then through the St. Lawrence to inland mills; U. S. Steel Co. has
announced the Cerro Bolivar find in Venezuela from which 10 to 15 million
tons a year will be shipped to the United States. Lippett, Journal of Metals
& Mining Engineering (Feb., 1950).
2. Art. IX, § 1, Minn. Const., before amendment in 1906 read: ".. all
taxes ... shall be as nearly equal as may be,". In its present form Art. IX,
§ 1, places little or no limitation on the power of the legislature to select the
method, subject, or rates of taxation: "Taxes shall be uniform upon the
same class of subjects, and shall be levied and collected for public purposes,
." Cf. Winget v. Holm, 187 Minn. 78, 86, 244 N. W. 331, 334 (1932) ;
State ex rel. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Ely, 129 Minn. 40, 46, 151 N. W.
545 (1915) ; Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County, 104 Minn. 179, 180-81, 116
N. W. 572, 573 (1908).
Art. IX, § 1A requires an occupation tax to be levied on iron ore mining
based upon valuation of iron ore mined or produced.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sies, attention in litigation is usually focussed on the state,
represented by the Commissioner of Taxation ;3 and the operating
mining companies, who are challenging the method of taxation or
valuation procedures. No less important are the municipalities :4
cities, counties, school districts, towns and villages of the iron
range which receive their principal revenue from mill rate levies
based on valuations established by the state. In the background are
steel corporations which own, lease, or control the Minnesota iron
resources and the operating mining corporations; their interests
are in the continued future supply, the interstate transportation,
and basically low cost of the ore for their finished products.' Be-
cause much of the mineral property is owned in fee by persons
who in turn lease mineral and surface rights to the operating mining
companies, 6 the lessors are concerned with effects of high state
taxes in depressing the royalty rate received7 or increasing the
number of leases terminated in periods of low demand for steel and
iron ore. These local fee owners, as individual entrepreneurs, may
also carry the chief economic burden of new exploration for added
reserves of iron ore.8 Finally, the railroads, both publicly held and
private, have a substantial stake in the revenues originating in the
100-mile hauls from mine to lake ports.
While there is slight authoritative information measuring the
economic effect of Minnesota taxation on development of new mines
or installation of beneficiation plants to utilize low grade ore,9
3. See 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 270.06, 270.07 (1945).
4. See Report, Interim Legislative Commission on Iron Ore Taxation,
93 (Minnesota, 1941).
5. See TNEC, 18 Hearings, Iron and Steel (Iron Ore) 10362-64
(1939). Testimony brings out the relation of the control of ore properties
to the price of finished steel products and to taxes in a period of low ore
demand.
6. Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503 (1917). Royalty
contracts for the Lake Superior District are not mere contracts for the sale
of ore from the land but are true leases without impeachment for waste.
Royalties are rentals, as for farm land, and are current income from the
land. Normally, the lease provides for the lessee operating company to
pay the cost of taxes on the property for the lessor. But cf. the effect and
incidence of the royalty tax, which may reach minimum royalties paid under
the lease although no mining is done for the year. For an example of the
terms of such a lease see Day v. Inland Steel Co., 185 Minn. 53, 239 N. W.
776 (1931).
7. Transcript of Record, p. 17 (No. 336), Lake Superior Iron fines
v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577 (1926) indicates that of an average of $16 millions
yearly royalty, nine millions were received by fee owners within the state,
and the balance by non-residents. There is little reason to believe the pro-
portion of resident ownership has increased since then.
8. Thus in 1948, out of 89 exploration licenses only 3 were granted
to large operating companies (Butler Bros. 2, Oliver Iron Mining Co. 1).
St. Paul Dispatch, Dec. 22, 1948, p. 21.
9. Cf. Report, supra note 4, at 77-84. Bitt cf. J. G. White Engineering
Co., II Economic Analysis of Minnesota, 87-138 (1945) (original report).
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the state and local tax burden of the industry is substantial ° in
terms of total taxes paid and by comparison to taxes levied on
iron ore by other states in the Lake Superior District. An analysis
of state and local direct taxes since 1914 shows a total burden of
more than $500,000,000 of state and local taxes on the one industry
in Minnesota. Comparative studies show that while Minnesota
consumed from $.31 a ton to $7.35 a ton in taxes, Michigan, the
other major iron ore producing state, taxed from $.17 to $1.17 a
ton; or an average of 21%, as compared to 6.5% of the sale price
used for valuation, respectively."- About 51% of the mine tax
burden is imposed by local units taxing to the maximum mill rate
the property valuations set by the state. Some of this local ex-
pense would exist if these were company owned towns; and the
tax does contribute to better living conditions in remote areas,
necessary to keep labor. Much of the economic objection raised
to such high total state taxation has been to indicate large re-
serves of ore available in other countries as against diminishing
supplies of high grade ores in the Lake Superior District. 2 Until
10. Four taxes reach the Minnesota mining industry directly: (1)
Classified ad valorem real and personal property tax. 1 Minn. Stat. § 273.13(1945). Iron ore is classified at 50% of "full and true value," business prop-
erty at 40%o, and agricultural real estate at 33Y3%. (2) Mining occupation
tax. 1 Minn. Stat. § 298.01 (1945). A privilege or excise tax on tonnage
actually severed based on the "valuation" of the ore mined each year. The
1950 rate is 12% on such valuation; it was 6% in 1937. (3) A Royalty tax.
1 Minn. Stat. § 299.01 (1945). The 1950 rate is 12% of the royalty paid the
lessor; in 1937 it was 6%. The tax has been characterized as a privilege
tax, Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577 (1926) ;
and as a property tax, State ex rel. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Armson,
181 Minn. 221, 232 N. W. 35 (1930) ; Marble v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 172
MWinn. 263, 215 N. W. 71 (1927). (4) The Taconite (low grade iron ore)
tonnage tax. 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 298.24, 298.25 (1945). The 1950 rate is five
cents a ton upon the concentrate shipped, plus 1/10 of one per cent per unit
of iron over a standard minimum iron content. This tax is in lieu of the
ad valorem property tax on the ore itself or the mining plant. This tax is
in addition to the occupation tax and in addition to the royalty tax. Although
the occupation tax is in lieu of state income tax, it is claimed that an 11%
occupation tax rate is the equivalent to a 23% income tax rate based on net
income which exceeds the income tax imposed on other industries. But see
J. G. White Engineering Corp., II Economic Analysis 136-37 (1945)(original report).
11. M1inn. Dep't Tax., 21st Biennial Report, 55-56 (1948); Report.
supra note 4, at 76; J. G. White Engineering Corp., II Economic Analysis of
Minnesota, 128 (1945) (original report).
12. But ef. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10387-88, in which it was denied
there was in 1939 a problem of conservation of a natural resource. Esti-
mate in 1946 of the Minnesota Department of Taxation show reserves of
1,206,000,000 tons, or about 63% of the estimate made in 1910 of 1,905,000,000
for the Lake Superior District. Conservative independent estimates as of
May 1, 1945, not made for tax purposes, showed 1,572,000,000 tons of normal
shipping ore in Minnesota alone; and about 2 billion tons for the whole
Lake Superior District. Direct testimony, I. C. C. Docket 29502 (June 30,
1947). These estimates did not include the low-grade taconite and magnetic
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very recently, however, few low grade ore beneficiation plants
were established, unless under auspices of the state or small en-
trepreneurs. Little or no outside capital came in to explore for or
develop new mines or reserves after the expansion during the
First World War.' 3
II. JURISDICTION TO TAX-INCLUSION OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
INCREMENTS OF VALUE IN PROPERTY TAX VALUATIONS
With the burden still on the taxpayer to convince federal courts
that objection to a particular tax on mineral resources destined for
interstate commerce is more than a plea for individual exemption
from operation of the state's revenue systems, and with an immense-
ly technical set of commerce clause distinctions, the state courts are
increasingly important moderators to protect the legislature from it-
self and shield non-resident owners or investors from discrimination
or unfavorable administration of tax laws." Recent cases show re-
luctance by the federal courts to invalidate taxes which have been
sustained by state courts,' 5 so the place to win, if at all, is before
the state courts. 6 The equal protection clause of the 14th Amend-
ment and the Minnesota uniformity provision offer scant protection
against the singling out of mineral resources for unusual burdens
of multiple taxation.'7 The due process clause, however, may have
several points of leverage: the question of whether the purpose for
which the property tax is levied is properly a "public purpose";
whether the taxing state has jurisdiction to tax the values selected
in view of the domicile of the owner and kind of property; and the
multiple questions of procedural due process in valuation, assess-
ment, and collection of the tax.' "
ores. The average shipping rate from Minnesota has been below 50 to 60
million tons a year.
13. Report, supra note 4, at 78; Minn. Tax Comm'n, 11th Biennial
Report, 140-41 (1928). J. G. White Engineering Corp., II Economic Analy-
sis, 134, 138 (1945) (original report).
14. See Powell, Current Current of the Commerce Clause and State
Taxation, Proc. Nat. Tax Conf. 1, 38 (1940) ; Powell, Supreme Court
Condonations and Condemnations of Discriminatory State Taxation, 12 Va.
L. Rev. 441, 562 (1926).
15. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948); Nash-
ville Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940); Illinois Cent. Ry. v Minn.,
309 U. S. 157 (1940).
16. See text commencing page 423 for the procedural difficulties of
placing state tax cases in Federal Courts.
17. E.g., Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 179 (1923);
Lake Superior Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577, 581 (1926); Lyons v.
Spaeth, 220 Minn. 563, 567, 20 N. W. 2d 481, 484 (1945).




Few cases have explored the contention that where unusual
amounts of money are raised by taxes on a special class of persons
the legisature has exceeded its power to tax because the money
raised has no clear relation to those subjected to the special bur-
den. " The cases dealing with so-called "special assessments" are
legion.20 But unless tax exemptions or special rebate provisions
are involved,21 it is usually assumed the general revenue purpose
is closely enough related to the source of taxation to be a proper
purpose. Now, if the incidence of taxation is shown in fact to rest
upon values created by industry lying entirely outside the state,
and because of capital invested entirely away from the protection
of the taxing state, then the "public purpose" of a tax on extra-
territorial values existing due to integration may be dangerously
remote from the source of tax. There can be no representation of
the extraterritorial interests in the taxing state's legislature; no
chance exists for election of persons to administer the funds so
raised by any electorate in size proportionate to the money con-
tributed or numerically interested and dependent on the values
taxed; and in the case of natural resources so taxed, there is no
chance of future benefit to the extraterritorial enterprises thus
levied upon, once the resources are exhausted.
Closely related is the question of jurisdiction to tax, which has
been raised frequently in connection with capital levies on in-
tangibles, inheritance taxes, apportioned excise or sales taxes,
and corporate franchise taxes.22 Due process limitations on juris-
diction to tax have not been argued or decided directly in the
iron ore ad valorem tax cases, other than by inference in discussion
19. See Powell, Due Process Tests of State Taxation, 1922-1925, 74
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 423, 436 (1926).
20. Ibid.
21. Reinoteness in Time: Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U. S. 1 (1884) ; State
ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 20, 151 N. W. 331 (1913) ; see Green v.
Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 238 (1920) ; Remoteness of Benwfit: Parkersberg v.
Brown, 106 U. S. 487, 500 (1882) ; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873)
Michigan Sugar Co. v. Auditor General, 124 Mich. 674, 83 N. W. 625(1900); State v. Lafayette Fire Ins. Co., 134 La. 78, 63 So. 630 (1913) ; see
McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 137, 241 (1930)
106 A. L. R. 906 (1937).
22. Harding, Double Taxation of Property and Income §§ 11, 18 20
(1933) ; Powell, Due Process Tests of State Taxation, 1922-1925, 74 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 423, 426 (1926). Three constitutional provisions may be in-
volved: the due process clause, the equal protection clause (both under the
14th Amendment), and the full faith and credit clause (Art. IV) (although
few tax cases have explored the conflicts of laws question of the power of
the state of domicile of a corporation to tax as excluding other states as a
matter of full faith and credit). Cf. Scott, Business Jurisdiction over Non-
Residents Doing Business Within a State, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871 (1919). See
Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 587, 594 (1919).
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of Lake Erie price as the basis for capitalized anticipated yield
valuation.2 3 Both as to the question of reaching a proper valuation
and as to the power of the state to levy a property tax in terms
of the "going concern" value of the mining companies, jurisdiction
to tax would seem a crucial issue before either state or federal
courts.
2 4
Assuming the mining corporation to be a Minnesota corpora-
tion, property and occupation taxes of the domiciliary state which
is also the actual "situs" of the property would seem at first sight
not open to challenge.25 Upon closer analysis, there is difficulty in
deciding whether "the property" is the iron ore itself unsevered,
the severed iron ore in cars en route to lake vessels, or iron ore at
any and all points from the pits to the blast furnace, part of a con-
tinuous stream of tonnage. 2r There is the further difficulty that the
value selected as the value of ore at the mine for ad valorem proper-
ty tax and occupation tax purposes represents an artificial price
which in no sense always reflects a bargained market value.
Where the operating mining company taxed is not domiciled
in Minnesota but is a New Jersey or Delaware corporation pro-
ducing from mines in two or more states, as is often the case,
the value of iron ore taxed at the Lake Erie price basis includes
increments of value added by the integrated ownership of steel
plants, systems of railroads and lake vessels, and an organized iron
ore and finished steel marketing network, all of which may exag-
gerate heavily the value of the mines to the investor in such an
23. State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 395, 279 N. W. 614
(1936) ; Village of Aurora v. Comm'r of Taxation, 217 Minn. 64, 14 N. W.
2d 292 (1933). Cf. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town of Wakefield, 247 U. S.
350 (1918) ; State Tax Comm'r v. Magma Copper Co., 41 Ariz. 97, 15 P. 2d
961 (1932) discussed in note 43 and following, infra.
24. Cf. Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Ky., 188 U. S. 385 (1903) ; Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Commonwealth v.
West India Oil Refining Co., 138 Ky. 828, 129 S. W. 301 (1910) ; State
ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Lion Oil Refining Co., 171 Ark. 209, 284 S. W. 33
(1926) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481 (9th Cir. 1919) ; Franklin
v. Nevada-Calif. Power Co., 264 Fed. 643 (9th Cir. 1920) ; Wheeling Steel
v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949).
25. New York ex tel. N. Y. Central Ry. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584
(1906); Southern Pac. Ry. v. Ky., 222 U. S. 63 (1911). But cf. Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 194 (1905) ; Maxwell v. Bugbee,
250 U. S. 525 (1919); Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U. S. 88 (1923). The
Supreme Court may adopt the state court's characterization of the tax.
N. Y. ex rel. Clyde v. Gilchrist, 262 U. S. 94 (1923).
26. In measuring wealth of the corporate person domiciled in the state,
the state is more restricted in taxing the value of chattels or personal prop-
erty which has acquired a situs elsewhere in the imposition of a property
tax or an occupation tax measured by the privilege exercised wholly within
the state. E.g., Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 194 (1905)
Delaware, L. & W. Ry. v. Pa., 198 U. S. 341 (1905). See note 31 infra.
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integrated enterprise. If the tax is in reality upon the value of
transportation systems, furnaces, and a marketing organization,
can the state be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction to tax?
The incidence of the tax, whether ad valorem or occupation tax,
and the methods of appraisal become crucial to the question of
power to tax. Analysis of the capitalized future net profits method
of mine valuation now in use shows that extraterritorial values
are in fact included in values taxed as being at the mine in Minne-
sota. Then, this being the case, the nature of the occupation and
royalty taxes, whether characterized as a property tax or simply
as a tax on the privilege of mining, is relevant to the state's power
to impose the tax: If it is a privilege tax or excise there is authority
to the effect that a tax by state A on a privilege exercised in state
A by a foreign corporation licensed to do business there may be
levied although the tax reaches intangibles or property sent out
of state.27 On the other hand, in the case of an ad valorem property
tax, due process requires the tangible property taxed to have
"situs" within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing state, re-
gardless of the domicile of the owner.28 And if a property tax
reaches intangible property, the tax ought to apply only at the
"situs" where such intangibles are permanently located, employed,
and protected.23 The underlying reason for denial of power to
levy a property tax on property outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the taxing state is an assumption that the state, in return for
the power of taxation, renders services in protection of property,
enhancement of the value through improvements, and provision
for public conveniences; therefore, if the taxing state cannot render
these services, the taxation of such property, where it is in the
jurisdiction of another state, is an extortion rather than a tax.30
27. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940) (sustaining
a privilege tax as a deferred levy on corporate income derived in Wisconsin).
28. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 194 (1905)(domicile in the taxing state). Cf. note 24 supra (domicile outside the taxing
state). Then what effect will the doctrine of "commercial domicile" have on
this distinction? Cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936);
First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minn., 301 U. S. 234 (1937) ; Memphis Natural
Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948) seinbe; Wheeling Steel Co. v.Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949) (intangibles, equal protection clause).
29. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899) ; Bristol v. Washing-
ton County, 177 U. S. 133 (1900) ; State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir
National d'Escompte de Paris, 191 U. S. 388 (1903) (all cases involving thebusiness situs of tangible evidence of credits); cf. Wheeling Steel Co. v.
Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949). The question is open whether the states of
"commercial domicile" of the corporation and the domicile of incorporation
and the "business situs" of intangibles can tax the intangibles.
30. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 194, 202(1905).
1950]
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The precise question of the extent to which the state of situs
of natural resources has jurisdiction to include in the assessed
values for a property tax the intangible values created by the
existence of capital structures and organizations in other states
essential to utilize the natural resources, has not been adjudicated
in any cases coming to the attention of the writer.3' In Hope
Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, -3 2 an annual privilege tax on gross pro-
ceeds of sales, not an ad valorem property tax, was sustained
against objections by a foreign corporation that the state was tax-
ing interstate commerce itself, and that values contributed by the
pipe line as a whole, and not merely those at the well, were in-
cluded in the appraisal ;3S the due process question was not directly
raised nor adjudicated; the state court included the extraterritorial
values as the value at the well. In City of Galveston v. American
National Ins. Co.,34 an intermediate state court required that the
true value of the foreign realty owned by a corporation be de-
ducted from assessed value of personal property in total assets for
purposes of a personal property tax. Cvdahy Packing Co. v. Minnc-
sota 5 involved the Minnesota constitutional provision for a gross
earnings tax on railroads in lieu of all property taxes; there it was
held proper to consider intangible property above cash values of
the cars incident to the use of a fleet of refrigerator cars owned by
31. Two state decisions are close to the point; both are cited as in-
volving the refusal of the courts to apply the "unit rule" to properties other
than public utilities using mileage ratios. In reality, both cases involve
refusal of- the state court to use a capitalized future earnings method of
valuation for property tax valuations. American Bauxite Co. v. Bd. of
Equalization, 119 Ark. 362, 177 S. W. 1151 (1915); State ex rcl. Atty.
Gen. v. Lion Oil Refining Co., 171 Ark. 209, 284 S. W. 33 (1926) ; cf.
Standard Oil Co. v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481 (9th Cir. 1919); Franklin v.
Nevada-Calif. Power Co., 264 Fed. 643 (9th Cir. 1920); Rowland v. City
of Tyler, 5 S. W. 2d 756 (1928) ; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. King
County, 10 Wash. 2d 424, 116 P. 2d 827 (1941). See 2 Cooley, Taxation§811 (4th ed. 1924).32. 274 U. S. 284 (1927). This case raised, but did not adjudicate, the
questions of integrated values and extraterritorial values above sale price
at the well as a due process question, and under the commerce clause. See
Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 509-11(1947). The record, p. 258, indicates the West Virginia court below limited
the tax statute to the value of the natural gas within the state and before it
entered interstate commerce by a revised final decree. On appeal, the Supreme
Court seems to have accepted this limitation, although appellants argued
the jurisdiction to tax question by analogy to the cases dealing with cor-
porations engaged in interstate commerce.
33. Defendant below admitted value of the gas produced was aug-
mented by the pipe line system but contended it was enhanced prior to
transportation. Plaintiff contended there was a market value at the point
of production as distinct from the place of sale. Brief for Appellant, p. 31.
34. 14 S. W. 2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).




a foreign corporation used in interstate commerce and only occa-
sionally brought within the state. Significantly the Minnesota
court had held the gross earnings tax to be a property tax intended
to reach tangible and intangible values connected with them."
And the Supreme Court accepted this view of the tax, considering
the gross earnings tax as a measure of the tax on property. But
the favorable position of the railroads in Minnesota under the
constitutional exemption from all other taxes should be contrasted
with that of the mining industry of that state which bears a struc-
ture of multiple taxes. This railroad gross earnings tax situation
and the unit rule should also be distinguished from taxation of in-
tangible values wholly outside the state and which never enter the
state. A minimum of state contacts with: the situs of the place of
execution of contracts for sale of ore, the ore carrying vessels, the
blast furnaces, and the steel marketing organization, seems to give
a producing state little if any justification to tax some of the values
which may subsequently be heavily taxed by the state of situs.
Use of a valuation formula which included extraterritorial
values for ad valorem property tax assessments has been held
invalid in the case of a foreign oil company's retailing property,37
bauxite mines,- s oil and gas wells,3 9 power production facilities,
40
steam plants, "il and tailings deposits. 42 But more often the validity
of a capitalized earnings formula which included extraterritorial
value has been assumed as matter of necessity, 43 and no express
36. State v. Great Northern Ry., 106 Minn. 303, 119 N. W. 202 (1908) ;
cf. State v. Wells Fargo & Co., 146 Minn. 444, 179 N. W. 221 (1920). (Court
accepted use of capitalized net earnings as a measure of intangible value of the
corp.).
37. Standard Oil Co. v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481 (9th Cir. 1919) (capitalized
earnings formula could not be used, where it included wells and sales made
in California for purposes of real property assessments in Arizona levied
against the California corporation).
38. American Bauxite Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 119 Ark. 362, 177
S. W. 1151 (1915). See note 31 supra.
39. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Lion Oil Refining Co., 171 Ark. 209,
284 S. W. 33 (1926). See note 31 supra.
40. Franklin v. Nevada-Calif. Power Co., 264 Fed. 643 (9th Cir.
1920).
41. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. King County, 10 Wash. 2d
424, 16 P. 2d 827 (1941).
42. South Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325
(1923) (dictum that use of capitalized earnings method may be necessary).
43. Ibid; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350(1918) (by implication and on record below); Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co.
v. Republic Township, 196 Mich. 189, 163 N. W. 90 (1917), disnissed, 248
U. S. 592 (1918) (at request of plaintiff in error) ; State Tax Comm'n v.
Magma Copper Co., 41 Ariz. 97, 15 P. 2d 961 (1932). None of these cases
analyze or give reasons for adoption of the method. Mining companies con-
cede the method. State Tax Comm'n v. Phelps Dodge Copper Corp., 62 Ariz.
320, 157 P. 2d 693 (1945) (follows the Magma Copper case supra, rejecting
use of past profits by the tax commission).
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consideration given to the state's jurisdiction over factors used in
the formula. The question of domicile of the corporation taxed
and valued has not been discussed in the cases sustaining the
valuations.
It is submitted that two considerations should influence a
court's decision on the extent to which the non-domiciliary state
has power to include extraterritorial intangible values created by
going concern capital plant and organization in valuations for
purposes of the classified ad valorem property tax.44 Fairness
would suggest a weighing of the number and the importance of the
territorial contacts45 the particular industry has with the taxing
state, including the taxing unit's need for revenue from this source,
the protection enjoyed, ultimate profits derived strictly within its
territorial limits, research or geological facilities provided, and per-
sons employed by or dependent on the mining community. The
result to be reached then should be conditioned by the needs of a
commercial and industrial society dependent on abundant, cheap
sources of raw materials freely interchanged throughout the nation.
III. SELECTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF VALUATION
METH ODS-MINNESOTA
A. Concepts of Value-Wasting Asset Valuation
The early common law provided little precedent for definitions
of "value" for tax purposes ;46 there was a debate over the mean-
ing of "price" or of "value" in the statutes, chiefly relating to the
law of damages, but it became immaterial which word was used
after 1600. The cases prior to 1600 are unrevealing as to what
valuation methods, if any, were used in tax disputes with the
Crown; and less revealing concerning either tax valuations or the
measure of damages to be used in situations involving mines and
mineral property.47 Two principles of valuation of property for
tax purposes developed in the 17th and 18th centuries: that the
44. No opinion is expressed here whether those same considerations
should govern a privilege, occupation, or severance franchise tax based upon
tonnage rather than upon a capitalized future earnings test of value. In
theory, the power of the state to tax should be subject to similar limita-
tions; but due to the varying incidence of the taxes which have been im-
portant in the results reached by the courts, each statutory provision would
be subject to special analysis in view of the effect on similar taxes on other
businesses and the revenues of the taxing units. Cf. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937).
45. Cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936).
46. Matthews, Valuation of Property in the Early Common La', 35
Harv. L. Rev. 15 (1921).
47. Id. at 28.
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object in valuation should be to reach the fair "annual rental" of the
property as it stood on the date of valuation, unencumbered or
unaffected by outstanding leases and irrespective of the fact that
the lease carried greater or lesser rent than the fair rental value of
the property; and that "annual rental" meant the net income to
be fairly expected from year to year, not the greatest or smallest
income of the year for which the tax was levied.
The Roman law, which seems to have been ignored by the
early common law courts, made distinctions as to kinds of value
which are similar to those recognized in economic theory today.
These definitions form a useful framework upon which to analyze
the confusion existing about statutory definitions of value and the
results reached by courts in trying to reconcile the statutes with
administratively conceived methods of assessment. The Romans
considered four kinds of value :48 "Market value"; "ordinary or
general value"; "value to the owner"; and "sentimental value." It
is perhaps significant that the idea of "market value" was seldom
used except as to chattels traded regularly and contained no
fictitious assumption of a ready buyer or artificial market. Price
value, or what the property would bring if sold or rented, apparently
was used as "ordinary value." This was the usual basis of appraisal,
having the useful function of reducing recoveries, and it appears
in the inheritance tax cases. In compensation awards for damage
suits, "value to the owner" was the chief measure of damages;
namely, the value which property had by reason of its peculiar
qualities or due to the special circumstance of some particular
person plaintiff, so that it was worth more to him than to the world
at large. The selection of a meaning of "value" depended in part
upon the nature of the legal action and remedy provided, as well as
the quantitative result which the definition seemed to produce. A
modem authority, after a monumental survey of the field, reaches
somewhat similar conclusions that the definition of value used by
courts varies widely with the purpose :41
"As long as common law and statute law persist in using the
term "value" as a legal jack-of-all trades, judges are forced, willy-
nilly to reject the precedent of Humpty Dumpty: 'When I use a
word it means what I choose it to mean... neither more nor less.'
... That is to say, one must ... address one's self to the question,
what meaning should here be assigned to the term in view of the
interest of the legislature that used it, and in the light of the
48. Matthews, Vahiation of Property in the Roman Law, 34 Harv. L.
Rev. 229 (1921).
49. 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 1166-67 (1937).
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probable social consequences flowing from the adoption of one
definition rather than another ?"
The first mention in English reports of the principle of valuation
of mineral deposits for purposes of taxation in more recent times
seems to be in Rex v. Richardson,50 which held that lead mines
were not rateable for the poor under 43 Eliz., C. 2 (1601) since
the risk of mining was too great and the mention only of coal mines
in the statute was meant to exclude all others, although in fact
the statute was ambiguous. Rowes v. Gells' placed judicial ex-
emption of lead mines squarely on the risk involved, and the view
that to charge both the lessor and the lessee would be a double
tax.52 But the lessee of a coal mine, the one kind of mine mentioned
in the statute, was rateable only on the royalty he paid.5 3 In Rex v.
Bedworth,5 4 decided in 1807, it was held that the lessee of a coal
mine which ceased to be worked was no longer "ratable" for the
poor tax, although he was still bound to pay rent reserved to the
landlord. The general rule of valuation to the owner-operator for
tax purposes was the value of the rent, or what we call royalty, that
amount a hypothetical tenant from year to year would give for the
occupation of the mine.5 5 The test as to an owner-operator was not
what a tenant would give in the preceding year, but what a hypotheti-
cal tenant would give in the coming year.5 6 The value of the
property to the lessee operator for poor tax was the amount of coal
worked out in the previous year times the royalty rate paid. These
principles of property tax valuation are repeated in the English
cases down to the present time.
5 7
Although it appears iron mines were exempt from assessment
by judicial decision and by statute,58 the surface buildings, equip-
50. 3 Burr. 1341, 97 Eng. Rep. 864 (K.B. 1762).
51. 2 Cowp. 451, 98 Eng. Rep. 1182 (K.B. 1776).
52. Citing Rex v. Vandewell, 2 Burr. 991, 97 Eng. Rep. 667 (K.B.
1760).
53. Rex v. Parrot, 5 T. R. 593, 101 Eng. Rep. 332 (K.B. 1794).
54. 8 East 387 (K.B. 1807).
55. Cf. Rex v. Attwood, 6 B. & C. 277, 108 Eng. Rep. 455 (K.B. 1827).
56. Ibid.
57. Denaby & Cadeby Colliery Co. v. Doncaster Union, 62 J. P. 343,
78 L. T. 388, 14 L. T. R. 347 (Q.B. 1898) (evidence of the probable future
life and working value of the mine received as relevant to probable lease
value for coming year; evidence of costs properly received to arrive at net
annual value) ; Watson v. Charlesworth [1905] 1 K. B. 74, aff'd, Charles-
worth v. Watson [1906] AC 14; Farnham Flint, Gravel & Sand Co. v.
Farnham Union, 1 K. B. 272, 17 L. T. R. 150 (1901) (follows Rex v.
Bedworth 8 East 387 (K.B. 1807) in assessment for occupations tax).
58. Morgan v. Crawshay, L. R. 5 H. L. 304, 5 Eng. & Irish App.
Cases 304 (1871) ; Guest v. East Dean, L. R. 7 Q. B. 334 (1872) (both
cases construing 43 Eliz., c. 2 (1601). Cf. Rating Act, 37 & 38 Vict., c. 54,
§§ 7, 13 (1874) ; Rating and Valuation Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 90, § 22.
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ment, and machinery thereof were assessed separately and valued
in the same manner; that is, by the rent or royalty that would be
paid in the coming year by a tenant.50 There seems to be no idea
of value to a particular owner in this method of assessment but
rather something akin to the Roman "ordinary value." No principle
of what the mining property would bring if sold, or "fair market
value" notion, is suggested in the English cases, since it is appar-
ently assumed the chief utility of the mineral property will be by
lease to an operator, and that the long term value was too
speculative.
Very few tax cases appear in early American reports involving
mineral valuation questions,6" and these seem to accept no settled
methods of valuation. Until 1912, there was no principal method of
valuation in the Lake Superior district for the ad valorem property
tax with the exception of a tonnage tax in lieu of all other taxes61
for a period of ten years, between 1885 and 1896. The record in one
of the first cases to come before the United States Supreme Court
on iron mine tax valuations,62 shows the mining company arguing
at trial in 1913 that the then proper method of valuation was the
royalty that would be paid to a fee owner to induce him to part
with the ore in the ground, with some bonus for development and
opening the mine.6 3 The sale price of the property standard seems
to have been used by the Minnesota Tax Commission,64 although
it classified the mines by grade of ore and whether the property
was active, for purpose of applying a hypothetical single rate to
each class of ore. At first, the Minnesota Commission used the
estimates of the "ore in sight," furnished by the mining companies,
59. Guest v. East Dean, L. R. 7 Q. B. 334 (1872).
60. Robinson v. Allegheny County, 7 Pa. (7 Barr) 161 (1847); State
v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56 (1859) ; Garell v. Murphy, 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. 495 (Pa.
1871) ; Allegheny Comm'rs v. Union Mining Co., 61 Md. 545 (1884).61. Minn. Gen. Stat. §§ 1689-91 (1894). This tonnage tax of one cent
per ton on all ore mined and shipped was held invalid under the then exist-ing Art. IX, § 1, uniformity and equality clause, without extended discussionby Mitchell, J., when an urban real estate company made an affirmative de-
fense to its property tax that mineral property had been omitted from the
assessment. State v. Lakeside Land Co., 71 Minn. 283, 73 N. W. 970 (1898).
62. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350 (1918).For further discussion of this case see text at note 77 infra.
63. Transcript of Record, pp. 19, 20, Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town ofWakefield, 247 U. S. 350 (1918). The record also indicates that this method
of valuation led to assertions by the tax authorities that the largest possible
royalty payable in the area'would then properly be the measure of the true
value of the mine to the lessee. Id. at 104-10. Note that the mine managers
apparently exercised considerable influence over the local assessors to keep
the mine valuation low, although other local property valuations were even
lower. Id. at 74 et seq.
64. Minn. Tax Comm'n, First Biennial Report, 117-122 (1907).
1950]
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as determinative of the value. The Michigan Tax Commission, on
the other hand, had at one time or another also considered addi-
tional factors: quotations of capital stock on the markets, gross
and net income, recent sales of property, and ore production,", but
admitted serious difficulty in the weight to be attached to any one.
The difficulty with a royalty method of valuation was that the
leases were frequently secret, and the value of the property to the
lessee usually increased as the mine passed beyond the speculative
stages. In addition to these shortcomings, the royalty method had
the fatal defect of not raising enough money to meet the rising
costs of local and state government. But it should be observed the
methods in use until 1911 confined the property tax assessments to
incidents within the territorial limits of the state, by using a basic
theory of the rental value of the property, or its sale value where
sufficient transactions were available.
The first litigated attempt at a systematic engineering valuation
of iron properties for ad valorem tax purposes was undertaken in
Michigan by J. R. Finlay for the Michigan Board of Tax Com-
missioners.6 6 His principle of valuation was radically different from
the "ore in sight' royalty method since it considered the geologic
future of the property and the going concern value of the mining
company. Finlay was given only two and a half months to appraise
83 copper mines, 51 iron mining companies, lists of ore lands, and
over 50 salt, coal, gypsum and limestone properties.' The method
of valuation selected was admittedly a compromise between capi-
talizing quoted stock sales, often not available, and detailed exami-
nations of each property, which time did not permites The theory
of the valuation was to calculate the present value of the mines
to the permanent owner for production of minerals, being to
65. Mich. Tax Comm'r, First Annual Report, 54 et seq. (1902).
66. Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 114 (1911).
67. He was notified of the appointment May 24, 1911, and the report
was handed in August 21, 1911. Finlay obtained the assistance of five other
engineers and a small staff of helpers. Dr. C. K. Leith of the University of
Wisconsin was largely responsible for the iron ore appraisals. Valuations
were based on company reports of tonnage in the ground, past shipments
of the mine and in the area, cost data furnished by the mining companies;
These reports were considered in the light of mining conditions and prob-
able geologic structure of the area in which the mine was located. Transcript
of Record, p. 203, Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town of Wakefield, 247 U. S.
350 (1918).
68. Finlay's deposition showed no physical examinations were made
of the mines; he did not expect local taxation to be affected by the report;
he had diminishing confidence in the value placed on any one ore body or
mine. Id. at 128-29. Dr. Leith could not remember the dates of the visits
to the mines. Id. at 32, 40. He subsequently recommended the Tax Commis-
sioner discount Finlay's capitalized values about 10% against hazards. Id.
at 35 et seq.
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reach a sum the investor could afford to pay for the appraised
property.' The appraisals in the report covered the value of the
whole mining business of a company, including all the value that
could be put on mineral lands, mining, milling, and smelting equip-
ment, and mining supplies.70 In this sense, it was a valuation which
a prospective seller would use as the top bargaining price in nego-
tiations with a prospective buyer.71 The method frankly adopted
controversial estimates as to the prospective life of the mine, based
upon informed judgments as to the depth of deposits, known re-
serves, depths of adjoining mines, and the geologic structure of
the ore bodies. The Finlay valuation marked a departure from
ideas of what has been here labelled "ordinary value," to adopt a
principle incorporating a few of the ideas of "market value," and
chiefly ideas of "value to the owner.
72
Litigation which resulted from the Finlay valuation established
the capitalized future income method of wasting asset valuation
in both state and federal tax law. In Newport Mining Co. v. City
of Ironwood,73 under a constitutional requirement of assessment
at "cash value" 71 legislatively defined to mean the price at an arti-
ficial private sale, 75 the Michigan court sustained a directed verdict
for the defendant city in an action for repayment of taxes paid under
protest. The mining companies conceded the valuation method
was one used by engineers generally but contended proper factors
in computing value should have been "ore in sight" and the royalty
rate, rather than selling price less costs. The court sustained the
Finlay valuations, citing no cases, on the ground that it would be
used by an "intending purchaser," and that the state could properly
use the usual methods of business to ascertain the value for taxa-
tion.73 The mining company had suggested no other methods to
'value the property. In Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of
69. Mich. Bd. of Tax Examiners, Appraisal of Mining Properties in
Michigan (J. R. Finlay) 11 (1911).
70. Id. at 14.
71. See note 83 infra.
72. Transcript of Record, p. 131, Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town of
Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350 (1918).
73. 185 Mich. 668, 152 N. W. 1088 (1915).
74. Mich. Const. Art. X, § 7. "All assessments hereafter shall be
on property at its cash value."
75. Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 206 § 27 (1893).
76. At the same time as the Finlay valuation, the United States Steel
Corporation was defending its capital structure from charges that it was
u atered. It placed a valuation by the capitalized earning formula of 700
millions on its iron ore properties, or nearly 13 times the total assessments
of all the iron mining property in Michigan and Minnesota. 9 Hearing, House
Crommittee on Investigation of the United States Steel Corp. (1912, 62d
Congress) 548 ct seq. (Report, Comm'r of Corporations, 26-48).
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Wakefield,7 - the company contended valuation at full value without
a simultaneous reassessment to full value of neighboring non-
mining property was fraudulent and denial of equal protection
of law under the 14th Amendment. The decision of the state court
in affirming a directed verdict for the township in an action to recover
back taxes was sustained by the Supreme Court because there was
insufficient evidence to show intentional and fraudulent design
to overvalue in the method of valuation adopted. The mining com-
pany also failed in the record to establish discrimination due to
administrative failure immediately to reassess adjacent landowners.
Evidence of undervaluation of other property indicated the mine
had been equally undervalued until the 1911 assessment. The trial
court expressed doubts that the Finlay valuation was valid because
it assessed "going concern value" rather than the value of the
mine,7 8 but on appeal to the state supreme court this issue was not
argued; the mining company made "no serious criticism" in the
state court of the method of appraisal ;79 and the valuation method
was sustained there on authority of the Newport case. 0
The rationale of the decisions accepting the capitalized future
earnings method of valuation had been that in absence of frequent
sale of mines, it was proper to substitute value to the hypothetical
investor. But in Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Republic Township8 '
the mine had been sold recently at what was found to be bona fide,
good-faith transaction at a price substantially below the tax com-
missioner's valuation. The court sustained refusal to lower the
valuation to the new owner on application to the township board
of equalization since the usual business negotiations for sale did not
take into consideration nonvisible ore; and that one sale was not
numerically adequate to set a fair cash value. The first ground of
the decision was inconsistent with the assumption of the business
practices of the hypothetical investor used in the 1911 valuation.
It now appeared that the capitalized future earnings method of
mine valuation was well established in judicial thinking, at least
in Michigan, and perhaps before the Supreme Court, but without
77. 247 U. S. 350 (1918). But cf. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923).
78. Transcript of Record, pp. 177-78, Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town-
ship of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350 (1918).
79. Id. at 290, 291. See also Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Tp.,
186 Mich. 626, 630, 153 N. W. 14, 16 (1915).
80. Newport Iron Co. v. City of Ironwood, 185 Mich. 668, 152 N. W.
1088 (1915).
81. 196 Mich. 189, 163 N. W. 90 (1917), dimissed, 248 U. S. 592
(1919) (at request of plaintiff in error).
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serious consideration of the merits once it had been adopted as an
administrative valuation expedient.
B. The Analytic or Capitalized Future Earnings Method
of Mineral Valuation
Because of the importance of the analytic appraisal method in
calculating the value of an operating mineral deposit for many types
of state taxes and as a basis for depletion in federal income taxation,
it is necessary to examine the economic and legal assumptions in-
volved. In this method, the mining property is considered to have
a definite value chiefly by virtue of its ability to produce profit
over a term of years.8 2 To arrive at the present worth of estimated
future earnings through the life of the property, estimates are first
made of the available ore and probable output each year. The life
of the property is determined by dividing the total tonnage by the
probable yearly output. Then an estimate is made of the probable
profit per unit of extraction (tons, in the case of iron ore) by
deducting estimated cost per ton from the probable price per ton.
The profit per unit is multiplied by the annual output to determine
probable annual income. This annual income or an average for a
base period is calculated to its present worth over the assumed
life of the mine by use of the Hoskold formula, which sets aside
(1) an allowance for the exhaustion of the deposit in form of a
sinking funds or large dividends, and (2) provision for return on
capital or profit at an interest rate suitable to the risk in that type of
wasting asset investment. The dollar value thus obtained is the
amount a purchaser could afford to pay for the property.83 It is
believed this appraiser's value is a inaximunt value, that is, a value
which the seller might reasonably ask for the property, not a
normal value as finally reached between a willing buyer and a will-
ing seller which would be influenced by the range in differences as
to judgment in the importance of the factors.84
Most of the factors involved in such a valuation involve esti-
mates and judgments concerning which men could differ widely.85
The tonnage and quantity estimates in the ground are relatively
definite in the older mining areas when compared to estimates of
82. Baxter and Parks, Mine Examination and Valuation 103 (2d ed.
1939).
83. See, Leith, Mineral Valuations of the Future 30, 31 (1938). Cf.
Baxter and Parks, op. cit. supra note 82, Appendix "A" by F. G. Pardee,
"The Michigan Mine Appraisal System," 291-93; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.23 (m)-7 (b).
84. Leith, op. cit. mipra note 83, at 10, 11.
85. Id. at 33.
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future annual production, future market price, and the effect of
the business cycle in reducing demand or in opening up of new
and competing properties. Costs per unit of output in an estab-
lished property may be reasonably predicted with the aid of his-
torical indexes over a short-run period,"' but may defy prediction
over the 30 or 40 year periods considered the life of major iron
deposits. These uncertainties arise even before application of the
Hoskold formula, with its attendant controversies over the proper
sinking fund rate of interest and the suitable rate of return on risk
capital in the mine investment.
7
In calculating the "fair market value""8 for purposes of deter-
mining a basis for depletion of mineral properties, Federal Income
Tax Regulations place extensive restrictions about the use of
analytic appraisal methods, such as the present value method.
Analytic appraisal methods are not entitled to great weight under
certain conditions and are not to be used if the fair market value
can reasonably be determined by any other method.8 ' The Com-
missioner will give "due weight and consideration to any and all
factors and evidence having a bearing on the market value, such as
cost, actual sales and transfers of similar properties, market value
of stock or shares, royalties and rentals, value fixed by the owner
for purposes of the capital stock tax, valuation for local or state
taxation, partnership accounting, records of litigation in which the
value of the property was in question, the amount at which the
property may have been inventoried in probate court, disinterested
appraisals by approved methods." 90 Four situations are listed
86. Michigan uses the past five-year period which is said to give a
representative picture of the cost background, but this cost figure may be
tempered by deductions for conditions which can be foreseen. Baxter and
Parks, op. cit. supra note 82, at 296. Minnesota used an eight-year period in
computing past increases of labor costs from May 1, 1932, to May 1, 1940, in
Village of Aurora v. Comm'r of Taxation, Docket 55 Minn. B. T. A. 9
(1943) but used a five-year average for rail and lake freight and insurance;
it used no stated period for the other nine out of the eleven cost items. For
marketing expense, the Commissioner was permitted to use an estimate de-
rived from his inspection of past occuption tax returns, representing what the
Commissioner deemed a "fair average." It is said the selling price of ore
and costs rise and fall together so that the period selected may be immaterial
since the "spread" or difference remains about the same. Baxter and Parks.
op. cit. supra note 82, at 295-96. But quacre the time lag and effect of con-
trolled Lake Erie prices of iron ore upon the validity of a valuation as of a
given date?
87. Leith, op. cit. supra note 83, at 100.
88. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (m)-1 (a). But cf. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.23 (m)-7 (a).
89. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (m)-7 (a) ; P-H 1949 Fed. Tax
Serv. § 14,527, pp. 14, 460-14,462. See Id. § 14,528 for decisions on valuation.
90. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (m)-7 (a).
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wherein the analytic appraisal methods are of questionable weight :91
(1) "if the value of a mineral deposit can be determined upon
the basis of cost or replacement value,
(2) if the knowledge of the presence of the mineral has not
greatly enhanced the value of the mineral property,
(3) if the removal of the mineral does not materially reduce the
value of property from which it is taken, or
(4) if the profits arising from the exploitation of the mineral
are in great part due to the manufacturing or marketing
ability of the taxpayer or to extrinsic causes other than the
possession of the mineral itself. If the fair market value
must be ascertained as of a certain date, analytic appraisal
methods will not be used if the fair market value can be
determined by any other method."
Items (2) and (3) would seem to rule out the use of the
present value method of appraisal in the case of iron deposits where
the land receives its only value from the presence of iron ore, and
where the land will be useless once the mine is exhausted. The
objection in (4) should be especially valid in the case of mines
owned by integrated steel enterprises which own, lease, or control
their own properties and operating mining companies.
The Treasury has applied present value methods to determina-
tion of and value for depletion in the case of interests of the fee
owner lessors of iron ore property,92 although at one time the Su-
preme Court denied the validity of present value computations for
purposes of depletion, 3 as well as depletion itself9 4 in the absence
of express statutory allowance under the 1909 "income tax" laws.
But the objections raised in the Regulations to the use of analytic
appraisals, and the preference for other methods or factors of
valuation are equally valid defects in present value appraisals for
purposes of state property and occupation taxes.95
91. Id.
92. The uses of present value methods has not been contested. Royal
Mineral Ass'n, 5 B. T. A. 1126 (1927); Reinecke v. Spalding, 280 U. S.
227 (1930). Cf. Argonaut Consolidated Mining Co. v. Anderson, 52 F. 2d 55
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 682 (1931).
93. Goldfield Consolidated Mining Co. v. Scott, 247-U. S. 126 (1918).
94. Stratton's Independence Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399 (1913);
Goldfield Consolidated Mining Co. v. Scott, 247 U. S. 126 (1918) ; U. S. v.
Biwabik Mining Co., 247 U. S. 116 (1918). But cf. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.
Co., 247 U. S. 179 (1918) ; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103(1916). See Magill, Taxable Income 348-350 (2d ed. 1945). Sixteen years
after the passage of the 16th Amendment, the court changed its views to
allow depletion, and apparently accepted the use of the present value ap-
praisal. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364 (1925) semble(Minnesota iron properties) ; Reinecke v. Spalding, 280 U. S. 227 (1930)(under the 1926 act).
95. Compare 1 Minn. Stat. § 298.03 (1945) which adopts certain of
the factors in the present value method of appraisal as a basis of reaching
the "valuation" of iron ores upon which the occupation taxes are levied.
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Adoption of the present value method for property tax valuation
is subject to criticism for lack of uniformity when compared to
valuation methods used for agricultural or urban real estate and
business properties. It is also subject to the economic defects of
any capitalized income method as a measure of value. Most busi-
ness and urban real estate is valued for purposes of the ad valorem
property tax on the basis of various combinations of sale price of that
property or nearby property, cost or reproduction cost, and current
productivity. These methods attempt to assume the property has
a value at the date of valuation independent of the other property or
whole assets belonging to the owner,9 6 although ability to pay
unquestionably influences the outcome. The capitalized income
method, used in Minnesota chiefly for wasting asset property tax
valuations,9 7 assumes the expectation of a flow of goods or of
mineral product from a property can be the measure of the value
of property; it further assumes a complete convertibility of the
prospective mineral product into money value at each instant of
future time. But the money markets are subject to cyclical move-
ments and thus the "investor's valuation" requires an artificial as-
sumption of normalcy which has no relation to the usual statutory
definition of market value. Such assumptions of capital convertibil-
ity are of dubious validity in the case of minerals like copper, lead,
or oil where the selling price of the product fluctuates widely with
cyclical demand and discovery of new sources or substitutes, 8 and
the "pegged" price minerals, such as iron ore and nickel, where
the value of the mine investment is chiefly for control over the ore
supply.9 9 The most serious theoretical defect of capitalized future
income methods of valuation for purposes of an ad valorem property
tax, which legally should be restricted to values within the terri-
96. 1 Minn. Stat. § 273.11 (1945). Compare standards for mineral
property with standards for other property.
97. The use of present value methods of valuation seems peculiar to
wasting asset enterprises, not being accepted as the single method in other
fields. See 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 1012 n. 61 (1937). It is
interesting to notice that use of the present value computation for Chapter
77B and Chap. X reorganizations was first seriously suggested in connec-
tion with a wasting asset enterprise, although this does not appear in the
statement of facts in the Supreme Court. Consolidated Rock Products Co.
v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941) ; see Consolidated Rock Products Co. v.
Du Bois, 114 F. 2d 102, 103 (9th Cir. 1940). Under Chapter X of the
Chandler Act, the SEC can recommend a valuation to the District Court.
It appears the Commission favors use of capitalized future earnings ap-
praisals for industrial concerns as well. Cf. Flour Mills of America, 7
SEC 1, 15-19 (1940).
98. Leith, Mineral Valuations of the Future 80 (1938).
99. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10360-72. Apparently the chief advantage
of integration is not so much from control of price of the ore as from im-
provement of competitive position in steel marketing. Id. at 10271-10283.
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torial limits of the state, is the impossibility of valuing only the
local mine part of the enterprise as distinguished from the whole
assets of the integrated ore mining, transportation, marketing, and
steel mill enterprises.0 0 This theoretical defect is also a very prac-
tical defect in the case of the Minnesota methods of valuation.
C. Minnesota Ad Valorem Property Tax Valuation Methods-
Administration and Judicial Review Prior to 1939
The early Minnesota valuations of iron ore for ad valorem prop-
erty tax purposes, after the tonnage tax was invalidated in 1898,101
were chiefly a matter of guess or compromise ;102 until 1907, the
tax was levied by the mine owners and operators meeting to spread
the assessment over the operating mines according to value of
tonnage produced, which may have favored large mines with big
reserves." 3 This distribution by output prevented the establish-
ment of any settled principles of local assessment. 10 4 In 1907, the
tax commission undertook its first valuations, and, after investiga-
tion, adopted the selling price of the property as representative of
taxable value, using the previous sale price of the property or
adjacent properties as a basis to determine the taxable value of
all real property, including mineral lands. 05 As early as 1909, the
Tax Commission obtained the expert services of the School of
Mines of the University of Minnesota to estimate tonnages and
prospective life of properties on the basis of reported geology, engi-
neering data, and more recently, field surveys ;106 but it should be
noted that these services have been limited to a few properties
each year and only furnished an estimate of tonnage, not a com-
100. 1 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 226 (1937). Thus, the fol-
lowing factors in the present value computation outlined note 83 smipra,
include elements which are not strictly values at the mine: Selling price of
the product per unit; the profit margin between the cost deductions and
the interstate selling price; the rate of production which may be due to
control of a market outside the state of production and power to transport
or utilize the mineral; the risk rate of return on capital which may be
fixed not by the hazards of that particular mine or mining business but
rather by money market conditions; the sinking fund capital investment
return which also may be fixed by extraterritorial market conditions.
101. State v. Lakeside Land Co., 71 Minn. 283, 73 N. W. 970 (1898).
102. Minn. Tax Comm'n, Seventh Biennial Report, 21, 22 (1920).
103. Minn. Tax Comm'n, supra note 64, at 110, 111.
104. Lutz, The State Tax Commission 404 et seq. (1918).
105. Minn. Tax Comm'n, supra note 102.
106. Lutz, op. cit. supra note 104, at 405. This was a significant im-
provement over existing methods of obtaining engineering data upon which
to base any valuation of the mineral property. Use of the School of Mines
valuations in Minnesota probably led to the Finlay valuation of 1911 in
Michigan. See Transcript of Record, p. 32, Sunday Lake Iron Co., 274 U. S.
350 (1018).
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plete appraisal or valuation for tax purposes.107 The Tax Commis-
sion found that sales of fee title to ore properties were not suffi-
ciently numerous to justify use of the sale price method of valua-
tion;1O5s and in 1913, two years after the Finlay valuation, obtained
passage of the classified ad valorem property tax statute to mini-
mize the problem of systematic undervaluations of other property,
and the problem of equalizing mine valuations. 1°0
Influenced by the Finlay valuation and its success in the
courts, the Minnesota Department of Taxation uses a method of
determining "value" for purposes of the classifield ad valorem prop-
erty tax which it described as a "net profits" method of valuation.""
Selling price at lower Lake Erie docks less the cost of mining and
shipping the ore results in net profit for the year. Since all the
ore cannot be shipped in one year or any definite period, this net
profit is capitalized under the Hoskold formula over the prospec-
tive life of the mining area as a whole."' The tax rates are applied
to the value thus obtained.1 2 Costs are taken over a period in the
past selected by the Commissioner of Taxation as representative
of each iron range and as an indication of future costs; in individual
cases variations from the range average of costs may be determined
by the Commissioner.
In addition to the statutory classification of iron mines for
assessment at 50% of "true value," the Department of Taxation
107. Cf. Minn. Dep't of Tax., 18th Biennial Report, 69, 70 (1942).
See Minn. Resources Comm'n, Interpretation of an Economic Analysis of
the State of Minnesota 26 (1945) (based on a report by the J. G. White
Engineering Corp.).
108. Minn. Tax Comm'n, supra note 102. Cf. State v. Moore, 12
Cal. 56 (1859) (enough sales of mineral interests to permit value to be
ascertained with sufficient accuracy) ; Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. v. Republic
Township, 196 Mich. 189, 163 N. W. 90 (1917), dismLssed, 248 U. S. 592
(1919) (price at which the mine sold irrelevant to valuation under present
value method).
109. See Lutz, op. cit. supra note 104, at 400 et seq.; 1 Minn. Stat. §
273.13 (1945).
110. Minn. Tax Comm'n, supra note 102, at 22.
111. Id. at 20, 21. This is essentially the same method adopted by
Finlay and discussed above as the analytic appraisal or capitalized future
earnings method. See also Report, supra note 107, at 53-60.
112. Substantially the same sort of net profit computation based on
Lake Erie Price is used to reach the "valuation of all ores mined or pro-
duced" for purposes of the Mining Occupation Tax. 1 Minn. Stat. § 298.03
(1945) establishes the deductions permitted for the occupation tax alone,
and in addition provides, "(6) The amount or amounts of all foregoing
subtractions shall be ascertained and determined by the commissioner of
taxation." The Department has adopted the same cost computation methods
for both the occupation tax, and the ad valorem property tax which is the
tax being discussed here. Cf. State ex rel. Inter-State Iron Co. v. Armson,
166 Minn. 230, 207 N. W. 727 (1926). See Minn. Dep't of Tax., supra note
107, at 53, 54; Report, supra note 4, at 9 (Item 9).
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makes a further subclassification"' of operating properties" 4 into
nine groups to which it assigns class rates, or assessed values per
ton of ore in the mine. These nine subclasses depend upon variations
in analysis or grade of ore shipped, costs of mining, geographic
location, and geologic structure of the deposit. This basis of the
valuation is essentially a capitalized future earnings computation
for a class of properties rather than for any individual mine.
As has already been noted, a capitalized future earnings theory
of valuation normally considers "going concern" value as applied
to a single mining enterprise. The effect of the Minnesota method,
however, is to consider mines as grouped enterprises, according to
"natural differences of situation and location," rather than accord-
ing to differences in management or corporate efficiency which
would also heavily influence the hypothetical investor's calcula-
tions."15 There is the added difficulty that most mines in the group
may be part of an integrated steel enterprise and have substantial
ability to pay, whereas an independent operator, owner-operator, or
prospective new operator is compelled to carry the integrated con-
cern ton rate valuations represented by the major mines in the
subclass"0c for purposes of taxation, although he might be less
efficient cost-wise. Use of the Lake Erie price as a basis from
which to compute value has the further effect of including extra-
territorial values for the "independent" operator and of charging
him for a controlling position he does not occupy, since most inde-
pendent ore sales contracts were admittedly made below the Lake
Erie price."1
7
113. Report, supra'note 4, at 10.
114. Id. at 10, 177. There is no statutory authority for this method of
subclassification, although under the equalization power of the Commissioner,
1 Minn. Stat. § 270.11 (6) (1945), there is power to "raise or lower the
assessed valuation of any real or personal property, including the power to
raise or lower the assessed valuation of the real or personal property of any
individual, copartnership, company, association, or corporation"; with suitable
provisions for notice at least five days before the day of hearing.
115. Cf. Baxter and Parks, Mine Examination and Valuation, 14 (2d
ed. 1939) ("A careful investor will scrutinize the management of a mine
before he investigates its mineral resources and recent production statistics.")
The Minnesota subclassification grouping of mineral properties seems to
penalize careful management since no amount of cost savings could change
the location or original iron content of the ore. J. G. White Engineering
Corp., II Economic Analysis 130 (1945) (original report).
116. The absence of such independent or owner-operators is a marked
feature of the Lake Superior District even as to low-cost open pit ores. To
this extent, the present system of valuation serves to assist the exclusive con-
trol maintained by the integrated enterprises free from prospective competi-
tion. TNEC, .rpra note 5, at 10286, 10287-10290 (reference to prospective
opening up of a property by Butler Bros., then an independent, absorbed by
M. A. Hanna Co. in 1948).
117. Id. at 10313 et seq.
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The initial legal question is relevance of a capitalized future in-
come technique of valuation to the statutory requirements of
"value" for tax purposes.118 Minnesota statutes require that iron
ore shall be valued and assessed at 50 per cent of its full and true
value. 119
"'Full and true value' means the usual selling price at the place
where the property to which the term is applied shall be at the
time of assessment; being the price which could be obtained therefor
at private sale and not at forced or auction sale.' '
x2
"All property shall be assessed at its true and full value in
money.... In valuing real property upon which there is a mine or
quarry, it shall be valued at such price as such property, including
the mine or quarry, would sell for at a fair, voluntary sale, for
cash."21
"In determining such value, the assessor shall not adopt a lower
or different standard of value because the same is to serve as a
basis of taxation, nor shall he adopt as a criterion of value the price
for which such property would sell at auction or at a forced sale,
or in the aggregate with all the property in town or district; ... "122
The classified ad valorem tax provision,' 23 governs the method of
valuation used for ore lands; this section is completely ambiguous
as to the proper meaning of "full and true value," or the methods
to be used to reach that value. 2 4 Under the previously existing
judicial definitions of value, "full and true value" meant the usual
selling price at the time of the assessment such as could be ob-
tained at a private sale, and not at a forced sale.' 2' The usual
selling price of "like property in the same locality" is the present
standard of value for taxation of urban real estate, timber lands,
and business property ;126 to ascertain the sale value of these kinds
of property, the assessor can consider the location of the land,
revenue derived from it, and reproduction cost; it is immaterial
that the property could not be sold for the valuation placed on it
118. State v. Trask, 167 Minn. 304, 209 N. W. 18 (1926).
119. 1 Minn. Stat. § 273.13 (2) (Class 1) (1945) (adopted 1913).
120. 1 Minn. Stat. § 272.03 (9) (1945) (1939 from earlier statutes).
121. 1 Minn. Stat.§ 273.11 (1945) (first adopted 1860).
122. Ibid.
123. 1 Minn. Stat. § 273.13 (1945).
124. In re Potlach Timber Co., 160 Minn. 209, 199 N. W. 968 (1924)(urban business property).
125. E.g., State v. Atwood Lumber Co., 96 Minn. 392, 105 N. W. 276(1905) (timber lands cut between assessments) ; State v. Trask, 167 Minn.
304, 209 N. W. 18 (1926) (cut over timber lands) ; State v. Koochiching
tealty Co., 146 Minn. 87, 177 N. W. 940 (1920) (timber lands and real
estate) ; It re Potlach Timber Co., 160 Minn. 209, 199 N. NV. 968 (1924)(urban business property) ; State v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 182 Minn.
543, 275 N. W. 22 (1931) (inoperative flour mill over-valued); State v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Minn. 1938) (bank building).
126. State v. Federal Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Minn. 1938).
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for tax purposes 27 if the assessor has considered all the factors
present in reaching true sale value.
Under present revisions of the statutes, the definition in M. S. A.
§ 272.03 (Supp. 1949) would appear to govern'2 8 the meaning of
"full and true value," and perhaps alter the meanings judicially
given to these words when construing other sections. This defini-
tion contains express limitations as to the place where the selling
price is to be computed which would seem to exclude extraterri-
torial values; otherwise it is consistent with the definitions earlier
adopted by the courts. However, none of the ad valorem tax defini-
tions specifically or impliedly authorize the use of a capitalized
future earnings test of value for mineral lands, nor a standard of
valuation different from that applied to other property.
The reason advanced for administrative adoption of the analyti-
cal appraisal technique for mineral lands alone is the absence of
frequent market transfers of mines or mineral lands. While this
has been factually correct, the same absence of frequent sales may
be true of timber lands; likewise a wasting asset, which are less
frequently transferred as the area approaches exhaustion." 9 The
discretion of the Tax Commission and Department of Taxation in
selection of an appropriate method of valuation has been sustained
in the use of the capitalized future earnings theory of valuation,
partly because no substitute method was offered,"30 and partly be-
cause the contesting parties conceded the validity of the method, 3'
arguing only the choice of factors used by the administering agency.
127. State v. Federal Reserve Bank-, 25 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Minn., 1938).
128. As amended by Minn. Laws 1947, c. 325, § 1. "Subd. 8 . . . 'Full
and true value' means the usual selling price at the place where the property
to which the term is applied shall be at the tine of assess-nient; being the
price which could be obtained at private sale and not at forced or auction
sale." (Italics added.) "Subd. 3. Construction of terms. For the purpose of
chapters 270 to 284, unless a different meaning is indicated by the context,
the words, phrases, and terms defined in subdivisions 4 to 11 shall have the
meanings given them." 2 Minn. Stat. § 645.26 (1945) governs the con-
struction to be given two conflicting provisions enacted at different sessions.
129. State v. Atwood Lumber Co., 96 Minn. 392, 105 N. W. 276 (1905);
State v. Trask, 167 Minn. 304, 209 N. W. IS (1926) (timber lands). Cf.
State v. Koochiching Realty Co., 146 Minn. 87, 177 N. W. 940 (1920). Like-
wise in a settled community, transfers of business real estate become in-
frequent. State v. Federal Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Minn. 1938)
(rejected use of the capitalized future earnings valuation offered by the
taxpayer in depression period).
130. But cf. the factors considered in reaching value for purposes of
finding a basis for depletion under the Federal Income Tax. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111, 29.23 (m)-7 discussed notes 88-92 supra.
131. State ex rel. City of Ely v. Minn. Tax Comm'n, 137 Minn. 20,
162 N. W. 675 (1917) ; State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 385, 270
N. W. 609 (1936) ; Village of Aurora v. Comm'r of Taxation, 217 Minn.
64, 14 N. W. 2d 292 (1944).
1950]
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Although the statutes are silent, the relevancy of the method used
in relation to the statutory standard seems to have been assumed as
a matter of necessity, and perhaps later as a matter of choice of the
mining companies.
The Lake Erie price, which is the "market value" of ore used
as the basis of the analytic appraisal, has been found to be a "pegged"
price; that is, subject to the control of the major mining and steel
companies. 13 2 This price is derived from the first quoted price for a
substantial sale at the beginning of an iron ore shipping season,
based on a spot sale or a new long-term contract. It then becomes
the uniform spot sale price for the rest of the season, although
most contracts for the sale of ore and royalty leases of iron prop-
erties are based on a sliding scale percentage below the Lake Erie
price in accordance with tonnage taken. Since the Lake Erie
price has remained the same for long periods of time,133 and since
there is evidence the price has been influenced by agreements 3 4
among only the large prodticers and consumers of ore, price value
of the ore from which the deductions are taken to reach net profit
is said to be in control of the operating companies and hence may
be considered an improper basis to use in a tax valuation.135 The
further advantage of Lake Erie price from the point of view of
the integrated ,companies is that the sale contracts can remain con-
fidential.136 The Lake Erie price has the validity for tax purposes of
being an openly quoted price, accepted by the trade journals, and
considered as a pricing basis in the trade itself although not
reflective of the actual contract prices paid for the ore. 37 To the
132. State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 385, 390, 411, 270
N. W. 609, 612, 623 (1936). Cf. the precise memorandum opinion of the
five-judge district court, printed in Report, supra note 4 at 182, 187. See
TNEC, supra note 5, at 10305-307, 10311, 10312, 10317-325, 10328, 10330,
10343.
133. 1925-1928: $4.25/ton; 1929-1936: $4.50/ton; 1937-1939: $4.95;
1940-1945: $4.45/ton. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10311, 1049 (Exhibit 1367).
1946--$5.05; 1947-$5.55; 1948-$6.20. See Report, Dep't of Taxation, p. 61
(1947-1948).
134. See TNEC, supra note 5, at 10305-10307, 10311, 10312, 10317-
10325, 10328, 10330, 10343.
135. The more precise argument against use of such a controlled price is
probably sub-delegation of control over an element in the valuation to the
private group or industry as a violation of the distribution of powers clauses
in the Minn. Const., Art. III. Cf. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137(1912); Seattle v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928) (zoning delegations
invalid). But see State v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Minn. 387, 388,
26 N. W. 123, 124 (1885) (express legislative delegation) ; Note, 15 Minn.
L. Rev. 814 (1931).
136. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10309.
137. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10307, 10334. Thus there is an equally
strong argument that the trade practice or custom is being incorporated
by reference into the valuation, the standard itself having independent sig-
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extent that the fixed price represents a combination of values at
the mine and value to the controlling or owning consuming steel
companies, it includes going concern values which we have called
"value to the owner." To the extent this is a fictitious price, a pros-
pective independent producer or owner-operator would be charged
on his tax bill for a profit margin which included an ownership
premium the state considered as ability to pay due to integration.
And the owners of non-producing or reserve properties are taxed
for the potential value such ore may have in an integrated enterprise.
The most serious objection to use of the Lake Erie price rather
than the actual contract sale prices in valuation computations is
that it includes values which have no "actual situs" in the state ;138
namely, the selling commissions, the cost of transportation to the
lake for loading docks, and lake transportation from upper lake
ports to Lake Erie. It is a delivered price. The transportation rates
of iron ore are controlled partly by the I.C.C. and partly by the
consuming steel companies, 3 9 since one major railroad and virtual-
ly all the lake vessels are subsidiaries of the integrated steel com-
panies. Both the vessels used and the ore selling organizations are
domiciled outside the state; and both organizations often have no
legal relation to the mining company except by contracts to haul
or to accept a certain proportion of output at a fixed rate per ton.
It is true these costs are deductions in the M1innesota valuation
calculation, but the selling and shipping charges selected are an
average of past rates, not true estimates of the future cost. To the
extent the price level trend is upward, the deductions may have
no correlation with present or future shipping and selling costs.
Thus, as based on Lake Erie prices, capitalization to present value
of future earnings include: (a) tangible costs payable for services
having no situs or performance in the state, and (b) intangible
values due to integration; namely, the power to consume, and
control over contracts, methods of transportation, and sales, none
of these intangible values having an actual situs within the state.
nificance, by analogy to the wills and trusts doctrines. Cf. Stubbs v. Sargon, 3
My. & Cr. 507 (1838); Merrill v. Boal, 47 R. I. 274, 132 Atl. 721 (1926).
But cf. State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 385, 412-15, 270 N. W.
609, 623-25 (1936) (Hughes, J., dissenting below; quoted by Devaney
dissenting).
138. See Delaney v. Murchie, 177 F. 2d 444, 448 (1st Cir. 1949).
139. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10377-10381. The relationship of lake
freight ( a cost item in the valuation calculation) and of rail freight (also
a cost item) to the actual contract price is quite complex. The important
fact is that cost deductions for tax purposes do not include the actual costs




The analysis of power to levy a property tax becomes a question
of the "situs" of the property taxed. This is essentially a mixed
question of law and fact, that is, one of determining where the
facts of the particular property assessed should be placed on either
side of a judicially drawn, imaginary line of territorial jurisdiction
of the taxing unit. A finding that "situs" exists for purposes of the
tax may simply be a means of stating a result and give no clue to
the process by which the result was reached.1 40 The approach of
the courts in the recent cases has been via the power to tax with
little enlightenment as to why the situs was selected in a particular
place. 4 ' The question of situs of tangible real and personal prop-
erty of a foreign corporation doing business in the taxing state
should be distinguished from taxability and situs of property used
in interstate commerce 1 41 where the result can be mathematically
apportioned by the taxing authorities.
In the property tax situation, as to incidents of taxation which
are not measurable in strictly territorial terms but are contracts
or services rendered in other states necessary to activity in the
taxing state, a useful approach would seem to be a weighing of the
competing states' claims and contacts as to the particular incidents
being taxed. 43 Conflicts of laws analysis, analogous to that used in
choice of laws cases involving jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion for purposes of directors liability or corporate transfers leading
to insolvency, 44 would seem valuable in appraising both the extra-
territorial tangible incidents taxed in a valuation formula and the
intangible values represented by integration and ability to consume.
The situs of contracts for sale of iron ore and the organizations
performing those services are an example in point. These sales con-
tracts and the organizations making them are located in the lower
140. See Powell, The Business Situs of Credits, 28 W. Va. L. Q. 89-
91 (1922) (discussion of taxation of intangibles is equally relevant to the
tangible costs and items used in the deductions from Lake Erie Price).
141. Cf., e.g., (a) Death Tax Cases: Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S.
357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383 (1939); State Tax Comm'r
v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942). (b) Ad Valorem Property Tax: Virginia
v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15 (1934) (domicile and situs in the
state).
142. Viz., the "unit rule" cases dealing with railroad cars, and railroad
or utility mileage apportionments for taxation. E.g., Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Backus, 154 U. S. 439 (1894).
143. Cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936) (analysis
of amount and kind of business contacts the corporation had in the taxing
state, such as the location of its home offices, payrolls, etc.).
144. Cf. German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N. Y. 57, 189




lake port cities. Cost of the sales is a controversial item in the Lake
Erie delivered price of iron ore to the steel mills. 45 Although the
wholly owned mining subsidiaries of steel companies do not have
independent organizations performing ore sales services, they do
charge mill operations for such services in their internal book-
keeping, which closely reflects Lake Erie price.14
Similarly, contacts of the separate subsidiaries or companies
operating lake vessels with Minnesota are few and fleeting. Most
vessels are registered in other states; the largest fleet is an entirely
separate corporation from the mining company; administration and
scheduling is done in Cleveland and lower lake ports. The chief
contact with Minnesota is to load ore at the lakehead ports.
1 47
The situs of the intangible value labelled integration is much
more elusive, analogous to a chose in action, or to asset values
above appraisals of fixed assets for a corporation balance sheet.
Courts have recognized such a value exists, and have separated it,
in the case of privilege taxes on capital structure or taxes on credits,
from the physical assets of the corporation, in requiring apportion-
ment of the tax on a non-domiciliary corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce. 114 But some cases tend to look behind the place and
legal structure of incorporation, to apply tests of contacts with the
taxing state as a test of "doing business" more readily in the
integrated situation. 45 And the slightest contact with a taxing state
may conceivably be seized upon to give the taxing state an excuse
for jurisdiction, even if multiple state taxes on the subject of
interstate commerce may result' °5 0 But in the case of wasting asset
enterprises, where the mining has been declared a local enterprise
145. See Village of Aurora v. Comm'r, Docket 55 Minn. B.T.A. 11(1943), aff'd, 217 Minn. 64, 14 N. W. 2d 292 (1944) (evidence showed esti-
mates of cost of sales varied from 3Y/ cents a ton to 10 cents a ton).
146. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10330; Docket 55 Minn. B.T.A. 11
(1943).
147. TNEC, supra note 5, at 10330 et seq.
148. Southern Ry. v. Ky., 274 U. S. 76 (1926) ; Union Tank Car Co. v.
Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919) ; Adams Express Co. v. Ky., 166 U. S. 171, 183
(1897); Cleveland Ry. v. Pa., 15 Wall. 300 (U.S. 1873); Chicago I. & L.
Co. v. Lewis, 12 F. 2d 802 (D.C. Ky. 1925) (in connection with use of a
capitalized future earnings valuation).
149. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936); Cream of
Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325 (1930) ; Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185 (1897). Cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minn., 246
U. S. 450 (1918).
150. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948) (com-
merce clause). The implications of this case on the question of jurisdiction
to tax tangibles as well as intangibles, based on a contact of bare maintenance
of equipment touching the state, are rather startling. Cf. Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944).
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for state tax purposes,1' 1 inclusion of integration values via the
Lake Erie price and by low interest rates used in the Hoskold
formula would seem a questionable administrative practice, espe-
cially when the capacity to consume, transport, and raise capital lie
wholly outside the state. It is submitted that the proper test for
valuation purposes should be a weighing of territorial contacts of
the state with the integrated non-mining activities against the extent
to which the non-mining activities are benefited by the protection,
research, and services accorded by the state, rather than pure power
to tax, or lack of it.
Two other factors in the Department of Taxation formula in-
volve intangible extraterritorial values. Litigation over the capi-
talized future income methods of valuation has often centered about
the interest rate on earnings of mining property to be used in the
Hoskold formula, and the related rate of return on capital in-
vested.15 2 The first of these factors represents an arbitrary assump-
tion as to what the hypothetical investor would require as earn-
ings considering the hazards in wasting asset enterprises. The
second postulates a return of the capital invested in the mine,
equipment, and development. It is normally true that the investor
in mine property is found chiefly in the centers of population and
rarely is familiar with conditions surrounding the particular area or
property; he expects to have an early high rate of return to induce
his initial investment. 153 Another aspect of the interest rate as used
in the Hoskold formula is that it capitalizes either a sinking fund
151. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923) (occupation
tax) ; Lake Superior Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577 (1926) (royalty tax
which has been held by the Minnesota court to be a property tax).
152. State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 385, 270 N. W. 609
(1936) ; Village of Aurora v. Comm'r of Taxation, 217 Minn. 64, 14 N. W.
2d 292 (1944) (valuations for the ad valorem property tax). Cf. State ex
rel. Interstate Iron Co. v. Armson, 166 Minn. 230, 207 N. W. 727 (1926)
(occupation tax; rate of interest for depreciation of mine plant disallowed as
deduction against cost); Argonaut Consolidated Mining Co. v. Anderson,
52 F. 2d 55 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Royal Mineral Ass'n 5 B.T.A. 1126 (1927).
153. Baxter and Parks, Mine Examination and Valuation 144 (2d ed.
1939). The risk rate was set by the court for certain iron mining properties
at seven per cent in State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 385, -20
N. W. 609 (1936) ; but in 1943 the Board of Tax Appeals reduced this rate
to six per cent. Docket 55 Minn. B.T.A. (1943). Contrast this "risk rate" to
the range of risk rates recommended by the SEC in its capitalized future
earnings estimates for reorganizations: 12%-14.9% (Low risk) ; 15%-19.9%
(Medium risk); 20%-24.9% (High risk); over 25% very high risk. See
Flour Mills of America, Inc. 7 SEC 1, 9, 18 (1940) (using the low rate of 12
per cent to determine insolvency) ; Dewing, Financial Policy of Corpora-
tions 175 (3d ed. 1934). Mining has always been considered a high risk
investment, if not because of the physical hazards, then because of the un-
certain market and competition. See Leith, Mineral Valuations of the
Future 101, 102 (1938).
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to provide against exhaustion,5 4 or it represents a fund from which
dividends will be paid, including a liquidation of the original invest-
ment over the life of the mine.155 Both premises of the interest rate
represent "value to the owner," who may be domiciled elsewhere,
and not necessarily "sale value"' 5 6 at the place of valuation. Inte-
gration and control potentialities of the property may place the
"value to the owner" at a figure far in excess of value to an investor;
on the other hand, a turn of the business cycle or the opening of
other mines may make the property even worthless to an investor.'5 7
To tax the rate of return on future capital invested in mining plants
in effect taxes the prospective investor upon the ability of the
largest integrated company to raise capital in out-of-state money
markets. It assumes that the interest rate varies with the future
price level and with the reproduction cost of the plant, which in
effect places a taxable value on the plant investment based upon a
foreign money market fluctuation. The position of an owner of
mineral property may fall within all or none of these assumptions
depending upon a wide variety of factors: whether the property
is speculative reserve land or an operating mine; the reserve ton-
nage in the mine "in sight"; whether the mine is open pit or under-
ground; the dangers of mining it; the bargaining position of the
owner due to burdens of back taxes ;'"& his access to financial sup-
port; the purpose for which the mineral property is being acquired
-to control it or to operate it; his control of costly means of trans-
portation. These intangible factors may or may not have any
contact with the state.
Current thinking on the subject tends to analyze such intangibles
in a special method of "discounting for hazards," that is, reducing
the valuations reached through the usual Hoskold formula by
later applying deductions expressed in terms of a per cent of
capitalized investment value.5 9 This may be a circuitous means of
returning the valuation to conditions at the actual situs of the
property, desirable in result, but tending to show the remoteness
of the assumptions of the Hoskold calculation from the territorial
confines of the taxing state.
154. Id. at 99.
155. Id. at 100.
156. Id. at 11,31.
157. Baxter and Parks, op. cit. supra note 153, at 91.
158. See J. G. White Engineering Corp., II Economic Analysis 134-36
(1945) (original report).
159. Baxter and Parks, op. cit. supra note 153, at 145. Cf. Leith,
op. cit. supra note 153, at 98 (uses a blanket high risk rate of interest of 15
to 20 per cent).
1950]
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Having examined the most controversial factors1o in the
capitalized future earnings methods of valuation as applied by the
Minnesota Department of Taxation to operating properties, we
are in a position to consider the success of this valuation in the
courts. In Minnesota, as elsewhere, the litigation has centered
about the factors used in the formula, especially costs and the
interest rates. Perhaps necessity requires use of some form of
capitalized future earnings formula as the basic method, al-
though other methods are known to be available; but this premise
seems to be accepted by the Minnesota courts more by stipulation
and agreement of the parties than because it has been argued
seriously.
In State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co.' the state brought suit
to collect the balance of back ad valorem property taxes, part of
which had been paid under protest, from certain lessee operating
companies. The companies defended that their properties had been
overvalued and that the assessment erroneously used too low de-
ductions of costs and improper interest rates. The trial court, after
a special hearing before five state district judges, held that the com-
mission's valuation was too high, adopting by stipulation of the
parties a future earnings formula in a form the trial court created
to make a judicial valuation of one of the 41 contested properties. In
the 4-1 decision, the trial court split only over use of the Lake Erie
price as the basis for the computation of net earnings, the dis-
senting judge arguing that inasmuch as the Lake Erie price was
"pegged" and the mining companies refused to reveal the contract
price to consumers, the tax commission's valuation should stand.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the findings,
opinion evidence heard, valuation formula created, and sample
valuation established by the trial court. It appeared later that the
formula used in the trial court was ordered for the 41 properties
involved in the litigation, but that the Tax Commission continued to
use its classified grouping valuations for other properties not liti-
gated, refusing to recognize the court's formula except as to liti-
gated properties. 62
In the next case involving ad valorem property tax valuations,
Village of Aurora v. Commissioner of Taxation,16 3 the procedural
160. Discussion of the effect of postponement of the date of opening a
reserve mine, called "deferment," has been omitted. However, the sale value
of a property to an integrated enterprise may be reduced substantially if a
long deferment period is involved.
161. 198 Minn. 385, 270 N. W. 609 (1936).
162. Report, supra note 4, at 153.
163. 217 Minn. 64, 14 N. W. 2d 292 (1944).
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situation had been changed by the Reorganization Act of 1939, so
much that the decision turned on the finality of a decision of the
Minnesota Board of Tax Appeals. The municipality had appealed
to the BTA a valuation on mining property set by the Commissioner,
alleging undervaluation. The mining companies involved started
suit in a state district court, alleging overvaluation. At the prelimi-
nary hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals there was a question
whether the issue of overvaluation was properly before it or only
the undervaluation issue as raised by the municipality; the Board
held the issue of undervaluation was the sole issue and that it would
not stay its proceedings because of a pending suit in the district
court due to the difference in issue.1 64 In the final hearing before the
Board of Tax Appeals, the Board affirmed the Commissioner's
formula but revised the proper interest rates in the Hoskold
formula, granted less deductions for capital invested and ruled on
other deductions adversely to the taxpayer, raising the valuation set
by the Commissioner. " On appeal, by the taxpayer, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in an extended decision, held the finding of the
Board increasing the valuation was final as purely a question of
fact, but in the long dictum discussed the valuation formula, adopt-
ing much of the Board's views on valuation law as its own. The
Court re-announced the valuation method used by the trial court
in the 1936 State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co. decision, but in effect
held that the valuation was no longer a judicial matter once the
Commissioner's position had been passed upon by the Board of Tax
Appeals, in absence of a clear-cut question of law.188
The result of these decisions indicates the reluctance of a review-
ing appellate court'8 7 to redetermine mine valuations or to open the
questions of jurisdiction to tax and selection of the basic method
of mineral valuation on its own motion, although it has done so in
the case of ordinary business and timber properties.Y68 The judg-
ment of the administrative authorities is permitted to stand unless
the mining company can bring overwhelming expert testimony
and clear evidence to substantiate its position. The wisdom of
establishing finality of the Board of Tax Appeals findings where
there is also an implied selection of the rules of law will be dealt
with below,16 9 but the effect of the Aurora decision has been to re-
164. Docket 55a Minn. B.T.A. (1941).
165. Docket 55 Minn. B.T.A. (1943).
166. For this aspect of the case see Part IV, C, p. 433 infra.
167. See also cases cited note 274 infra.
168. See notes 125, 129 supra.
169. Part IV, C infra.
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move the questions of mineral valuation and assessment from effec-
tive judicial supervision.
Inconsistent administration of analytic valuation methods and
inclusion of extraterritorial factors in the Minnesota capitalized
earnings formula, unchecked judicially, points to need of a sub-
stitute for the ad valorem property tax. The cumbersome nature
of mineral valuation, incessant litigation and controversy, and
fluctuating yield which often has no relation to the sale value of
the property or ore productivity emphasizes the need in Minnesota
for a tonnage production tax, apportioned between the municipali-
ties and the state, and in lieu of other taxes. Such a pay-as-you-go
mine tax policy could encourage investment of new capital in the
state to develop and mine low grade ore. It would not force exist-
ing reserves of high grade ore into the hands of a few owners un-
willing to spend new capital, which is the result of present policies.
If such a tonnage tax is politically inadvisable, present tax
statutes should be revised to include valuation standards and
methods similar to those adopted in computing depletion for
Federal Income Tax purposes.170 Arbitrary administrative selection
of valuation groupings and subgroupings could be avoided by a
well-drafted uniform accounting and reporting statute to supple-
ment the ad valorem and occupation tax valuations. In drafting
such statutes special care should be used to avoid extraterritorial
factors in the various valuation methods made available for admin-
istrative selection. The Lake Erie price should be eliminated in
favor of actual sale prices of iron ore or the costs used for internal
bookkeeping of the integrated enterprises. The administration of
these revised valuation statutes should be supervised by the courts
using a rapid statutory appeal procedure, available to construe the
valuation statutes and to obtain uniform application thereof. Valua-
tion decisions involving principles and properties once litigated
should be regarded as res judicata under similar tax statutes as to
the matters litigated and binding on the Commissioners of Taxa-
tion, the BTA, and courts alike.1 7 '
170. Compare U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, 29.23 (m) et seq. See notes 88-95
supra.
171. The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been neglected by the BTA
and Commissioner in successive tax years. Compare notes 161-165 .upra:
Report, supra note 4, at 153; Restatement, Judgments, § 70, comment b(1934) (collateral estoppel applies to questions of law and matters adjudi-
cated in one property tax judgment which then cannot be raised as to the
next tax levied). Cf. New Orleans v. Citizens Bank, 167 U. S. 371 (1897) ;
Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U. S. 499 (1903) ; U. S. v. Stone and Downer
Co., 274 U. S. 225, 230 (1927) (successive federal tax judgments) ; sec State
ex rel. Flodin v. Dist. Court Koochiching County, 222 Minn. 546, 25 N. W.
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IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR OVERVALUATION OR IMPROPER
ASSESSMENT
A. Administrative Remedies
The taxpayer who is aggrieved by the initial overvaluation of
his property for purposes of the ad valorem tax has a long and
arduous trail through Minnesota administrative hierarchy if he
must exhaust his remedies before taking court action. His first
appeal is to the borough, town or city board of review172 if a com-
plaint to the supervising assessor is not successful. 7 3 The next
appeal is to the county board of equalization, which has power to
reduce the assessment of real or personal property but not below
the aggregate value as returned by the assessors ;174 although the
county board theoretically has power to raise the total assessment.
The reduction restriction is a serious impediment to successful
operation of any localized complaint procedure and as a practical
matter results in reluctance to grant relief, especially in small com-
munities where one or two industries bear the property tax burden.
If he does succeed in winning agreement of the city board of equal-
ization, the taxpayer must also obtain concurrence of the county
board and the county auditor for the reduction, before the Commis-
sioner of Taxation can recognize the revision. 75 At one time there
was no provision for judicial review of decisions of the State Tax
Commission by certiorari.' 76 Now the commissioner of Taxa-
2d 692 (1946) (class suit). But cf. Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 597-
602 (1948); Johnson Lumber Co. 12 TC (No. 51, 1949) (income tax:
basis for depreciation, issue in earlier litigation distinguished) ; see Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgnnt, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9, 10 (1942) ; Griswold,
Book Review, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1037, 1038 (1935); Note, 46 Harv. L. Rev.
692-696 (1933) ; Note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 1404 (1933) ; 50 Harv. L. Rev. 991
(1937).
172. The Board of Review of a Borough can alter, revise, amend,
equalize, or reduce an assessment as it deems proper. 1 Minn. Stat. § 274.06
(1945). Note, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 692 (1931).
173. 1 Minn. Stat. § 273.071 (1945). Now the County Supervisor of
Assessments may be substituted in counties not employing a county assessor.
1 Minn. Stat. § 273.071 (1945) (§ 273.07 was repealed and the supervisor
system superimposed on the assessment hierarchy by Minn. Laws 1947, c.
531, §§ 1-15.)
174. 1 Minn. Stat. § 274.13 (5) (1945).
175. 1 Minn. Stat. § 270.12 (7) (1945) ; State ex rel. Foley Bros. &
Kelley v. Minn. Tax Comm'n, 103 Minn. 485, 115 N. W. 647 (1908). See
State ex rel. Interstate Air Parts v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Air-
port Comm'n, 223 Minn. 175, 185, 25 N. W. 2d 718, 725 (1947). But cf.
State cx rel. City of Ely v. Minn. Tax Comm'n, 137 Minn. 20, 162 N. W.
675 (1917).
176. State ex rel. Brown v. Board of Public Works of Red Wing, 134
Minn. 204, 158 N. W. 977 (1916); State ex rel. Hennepin Holding Co. v.
Minn. Tax Comm'n, 135 Minn. 282, 160 N. W. 665 (1916) (reason given that
the court could not fix the valuation which seems incorrect in view of
other cases, e.g., State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 385, 270 N. W.
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tion may hear appeals from the county board in his capacity as the
State Board of Equalization1 7 or under his complaint powers ;1Ts
these adversary proceedings are subject to review by the State
Supreme Court by statutory certiorari179 on the appeal of the tax-
payer or of the municipality ;10o the court may affirm, reverse, or
remand for further proceedings. The results of such proceedings,
which are primarily designed to handle complaints against assessed
valuations before the tax is spread, are not a bar to any or all
defenses the taxpayer may make in an action to collect taxes nor to
the spreading of the tax,"8' which means the municipality or state
can retain the same tax and valuation despite the proceedings. The
taxpayer can be put to his proof again in an action to collect the tax,
with the attendant expense and delay.
Since 1939, an additional, and perhaps mandatory, procedure
has been imposed by which the valuation may be appealed to the
Board of Tax Appeals' 82 by the taxpayer, state, or municipality.
Despite the continued presence in the statutes of procedure out-
lined above, the 1939 Reorganization Act contained provisions
which have been interpreted by the BTA to give it exclusive juris-
diction over all appeals from the Commissioner. 183 Whether the
609 [1936] ; State v. Koochiching Realty Co., 146 Minn. 87, 177 N. W. 940
[1920]).
177. 1 Minn. Stat. § 270.12 (1945). See St. Paul Dispatch, Dec. 22,
1948, p. 1, for an example of the commissioner's recent exercise of this
power in raising mineral valuations an average of 10%.
178. 1 Minn. Stat. § 270.11 (5) (6) (1945). Upon reducing the
valuation, suitable notice must be given the municipality. 1 Minn. Stat. §
270.19 (1945). However, if the tax is increased or decreased in excess of
$100, or there is a change in the valuation which will have a like effect, the
change must be approved by the Attorney General or his deputy. Ops.
Att'y Gen. 130-B (Aug. 10, 1939). The opinion of the Attorney General, if
requested by the Commissioner of Taxation in writing, upon any matter
within the scope of the functions of the department of taxation, shall have
the force and effect of law unless and until overruled by a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals or a court of competent jurisdiction. 1 Minn. Stat. §
270.09 (1945). This relation between the Commissioner of Taxation and the
Attorney General in performing, essentially a judicial function, seems to
raise a question of separation of powers under Minn. Const. Art. III.
179. 1 Minn. Stat. § 270.23 (1945).
180. 1 Minn. Stat. § 270.22 (1945).
181. 1 Minn. Stat. § 279.26 (1945).
182. 1 Minn. Stat § 271.06 (1945).
183. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.09 (1) (1945). Docket 147 Minn. B.T.A.
(1944) construed this provision to apply to all orders of the Commissioner
of Taxation and to equalization proceedings, denying a motion to stay the
BTA proceedings while a case was pending before the state district court
where taxpayer alleged overvaluation. In Docket 55a Minn. B.T.A. (1941) in
discussing a motion of taxpayer to stay or dismiss the action before the
B.T.A. because of district court proceedings by taxpayer on overvaluation,
the Board said:
"There is thus vested in the Board a full and complete right of
review and redetermination of the order of the Commissioner. Under
[Vol. 34:389
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BTA has such exclusive jurisdiction has not yet been decided by
the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has two
aspects, one of which is quite familiar in state and local taxation,
namely, that a court will not give relief in equity or refund taxes
unless the taxpayer has first taken his valuation problems through
available administrative channels.8 4 The second aspect is less well
recognized in taxation and has grown up in spite of express statu-
tory provisions preserving all common law or other statutory
remedies. The doctrine of "Primary Jurisdiction" is that a court
cannot entertain a suit for a rebate of rates or equitable
relief from administrative action where the character of the suit
or action is one properly heard or entertained in the first instance
by an administrative agency which may have similar jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the controversy. 85 Thus, review by the
Minnesota BTA by statute is conclusive only if the taxpayer has
appealed to the board or has agreed in writing to be bound by the
decision, otherwise, "all rights of action or defences in the courts
of the state respecting any tax, fee or assessment now afforded
the taxpayer by law shall be preserved."18 Does this mean the
procedures of appeal to the Supreme Court from the Commissioner
of Taxation or State Board of Equalization now authorized by
statute are still preserved?1s 7 The new statute seems expressly
to contemplate a coextensive jurisdiction of at least the state dis-
trict court on assessment and valuation issues.1 8 8
section 2362-19 (a) (§ 271.10), provision is made for review of the
order of this Board by the Supreme Court. These three steps-that is,
the determination by the Commissioner, review by the Board, and
review by the Supreme Court when all rights are exercised, constitutes
in the last analysis the final determination."
184. First National Bank of Greeley v. Weld .County, 264 U. S. 450
(1924).
185. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abiline Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426
(1907) ; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). See
Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1938).
186. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.09 (2) (1945).
187. Cf. 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 270.23, 270.22, 270.26 (1945). It could be
argued that the ordinary certiorari (Ch. 606) was part of the "administra-
tive review" powers of the Supreme Court. 1 Minn. Stat. § 27026 (1945).
And that the BTA is now an optional step in that procedure, rather than a
mandatory one with the added advantage (or expense) of a hearing de novo.
188. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.09 (3) (1945) (provision for stay of the BTA
proceeding if the issue is the same in the district court as in the BTA). But
where a municipality alleges undervaluation before the BTA, and a tax-
payer alleges overvaluation before the district court, the issues are not the
same. Docket 55a Minn. B.T.A. (1941). And the burden of proof is on the
taxpayer that the issues are the same. Ibid. The district court has jurisdic-
tion to hear complaints of the taxpayer as to assessment when the equalized
assessment list is returned from the commissioner of taxation, and before
the tax is spread. 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 270.17, 278.01 (1945).
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The primary jurisdiction rule has been imposed by Federal
courts in situations where the statute was equally express in pre-
serving existing remedies. In Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co. 89 the statute 9 ' said "Nothing in this act contained shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but provisions of this act are in addition to such
remedies." The question is not whether other remedies exist at
law or by statute, but whether the courts will exercise self-restraint
in refusing the case because the controversy is one peculiarly suited
to the discretion, expertness, or procedures of the administrative
agency designed to preserve uniformity.' 91 And questions of valua-
tion and assessment, once the standards and criteria have been
determined judicially, may be held especially suited to the expert-
ness of the Board of Tax Appeals. 9 2
The Minnesota Court has two conflicting lines of decisions on
the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The earlier
tax cases seem to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
before the taxpayer could get relief, even on questions of power
to tax.193 But in State v. Koochiching Realty Co.0 4 in 1920 the
question was overvaluation of some urban and farm lands raised
as a defense to a proceeding to collect taxes. The trial court found
the assessment excessive and found the true value of each tract. On
appeal, the findings and new valuation by the trial court were
affirmed. The court was held not to be exercising legislative or
administrative functions. Permission of the county or state board
of equalization was not required in absence of statutory provision
for such permission. This case seems to have been followed and at
other times ignored. The court there limited In re Payment of
Taxes of Pine County9 5 to its facts; that case had held the defense
of overvaluation was not available to the taxpayer in a suit to
recover unpaid taxes on timber lands since he had failed to apply to
189. 204 U. S. 426 (1907).
190. 24 Stat. 387 (1887).
191. Cf. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. American Tie and Timber Co., 234
U. S. 138 (1914). But notice the situation where the question is one of
construction of the words of a localized statute or tariff, or establishment
of a rule of law. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S.
285 (1922).
192. Cf. Village of Aurora v. Comm'r of Taxation, 217 Minn. 64, 14
N. W. 2d 292 (1944).
193. Clarke v. Board of Comm'rs, 66 Minn. 304, 69 N. W. 25 (1896);
State v. Robert Holmes, 162 Minn. 173, 202 N. W. 440 (1935). Sec State
ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports
Comm'n, 223 Minn. 175, 185, 25 N. W. 2d 718, 725 (1947).
194. 146 Minn. 87, 177 N. W. 940 (1920).
195. 96 Minn. 392, 105 N. W. 276 (1905).
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the county board for relief. However, the Pine County Case was
"followed" in 1936 in State ex rel. Hendrickson v. Strom,'5 6 where
the court refused mandamus to compel a county auditor to reclassify
the taxpayer's property as a homestead since no facts had been
presented to the assessor or county board prior to the petition. The
Strom Case seems to point in the direction of adoption of the pri-
mary jurisdiction rule since the action demanded was peculiarly in
the discretion of the administrative agency, and the petition for
court action came before any administrative appeal.
If the assessment procedure prior to spreading the final tax on
the county or city tax rolls involves a seven and possibly an eight
step procedure'9 7 prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies,
neither the primary jurisdiction rule nor the requirement of ex-
haustion of remedies would seem to make sense if applied judicially
in Minnesota, since the procedures prior to the Board of Tax
Appeals are already too cumbersome and lacking in supervision. 98
Instead, some legislative overhauling and simplification of the
existing statutory structure seems in order. The assessment pro-
cedure should be reduced to a three step procedure: the local
board, the Tax Commissioner, and to a District Court. After the
decision of the county or city board, the Board of Tax Appeals
could hear the case for the Commissioner, making findings similar
to those made on a contested equalization or complaint. It would
seem important also to have court supervision over the administra-
tive decision, using the same district court that would hear the
later petition to reduce assessment or defense in a suit to collect
taxes, if indeed the actions could not be consolidated prior to
spreading the tax. The Supreme Court could refuse certiorari from
a district court unless a serious conflict of principles of valuation
or rule of law arose between the court and the state administrative
authorities.
B. Judicial Remedies
Much already has been written showing the uncertainty of tax-
payer's remedies for erroneous property tax valuations.199 It will
196. 198 Minn. 173, 269 N. W. 371 (1936). See Farmer's Bank v.
Billstein, 204 Minn. 224, 226, 283 N. W. 138, 140 (1938) (declaratory judg-
ment law application refused; mandamus the proper remedy).
197. City or county supervisor of assessors; city board of review;
county board of equalization; (possibly the county auditor); the State
board of equalization; the state tax commissioner; the board of tax appeals;
and the Supreme Court.
198. See 1 Minn. Stat. § 274.10 (1945). See also Minn. Resources
Comm'n, supra note 107, at 55, 56.
199. E.g., Note, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 692 (1931) (criticizing lack ofjudicial remedies in 'Minnesota) ; Note, Remedies for Unequal Property
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serve for this discussion to point out that the statutory writ of
certiorari has been enlarged judicially in Minnesota to include
situations which involve review of judicial or quasi-judicial func-
tions of the local board of review or county board of equaliza-
tion.200 Injunctive relief has not been very successful in valuation
cases.20 1 Mandamus may now lie to review discretionary adminis-
trative action, but it has had an uncertain career as a tax remedy in
the Minnesota courts, 20 2 and faces the objection that there is an
adequate remedy at law. 03
The statutory remedies at law provided for illegal assessments,
overvaluations, unfair or unequal assessment, and prior payment
of real property taxes are: first, to serve copies of a petition 204 to
the state district court on the county auditor, county treasurer and
county attorney prior to the levy of the tax on June first of the year
the tax becomes payable; or secondly, to raise these objections as
a defense2 5 in the action to collect delinquent real property taxes.
But there is a condition precedent to the first method that the peti-
Valuations, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1000 (1933) (recommends centralized super-
vision and scientific assessment as a basic necessity); Note, 26 Mich. L.
Rev. 922 (1928) (weakness of most extraordinary writs and equitable
remedies) ; Note, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 594 (1924) (injunction a weak remedy
except where the valuation clearly can be proved fraudulent). See Sherwood.
Mandamus to Review State Administrative Action, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 123(1946) ; McAllister, Taxpayers Remedies-Washington Property Taxes, 13
Wash. L. Rev. 91 (1938).
200. State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 90 N. W.
772 (1902). See Note, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 399, 400 (1943) ; Note, 26 Mich.
L. Rev. 922, 926 (1928).
201. State v. Haynes, 82 Minn. 34, 84 N. XV. 636 (1900); Bradish v.
Lucken, 38 Minn. 186, 41 N. W. 138 (1888) (denial of injunctive relief in
a class suit). Cf. Schultz v. City of Mankato, 176 Minn. 76, 222 N. W. 518
(1928) (settled that injunction will not issue to prevent assessment of
taxes, there being an adequate remedy at law in the defense to an action to
collect taxes).
202. Cases where Mandamus issued: State ex rel. N. W. Airlines v.
Comm'r of Taxation, 208 Minn. 195, 293 N. W. 243 (1940) (discretionary
function; mandamus proper to enforce duty to order a refund) ; State ex r-el.
Town of Kratka v. County of Pennington, 211 Minn. 569, 12 N. W. 2d 41
(1942) (where a "positive statutory duty").
203. Fajder v. Village of Aitken, 87 Minn. 445, 92 N. W. 332. 934
(1902) ; Wall v. Borgen Auditor, 152 Minn. 106, 188 N. W. 159 (1922);
Braddock Iron Mining Co. v. Erskine, 155 Minn. 70, 192 N. W. 193 (1923).
The exceptions are where the county board levies a tax above an amount
allowed by law. 1 Minn. Stat. . 275.26 (1945) ; or a joint suit which would
bring relief to many persons in lieu of a single suit Fairley v. City of
Duluth, 150 Minn. 374, 185 N. W. 390 (1921) (wheelage tax) ; and a void
assessment where the judgment would be a cloud on title. Minnesota Linseed
Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468 (1874) ; Sewall v. City of St. Paul, 20
Minn. 511 (1874).
204. 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.01 (1945).
205. 1 Minn. Stat. § 279.15 (1945), the remedy most often used in the
past. But if a judgment has been rendered under 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.01
(1945) on the assessment or valuation that will preclude the defense for
the tax year for which rendered. 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.13 (1945).
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tioner pay at least 50 per cent of the tax levied for the year, 0 6 unless
it appears the property would be exempt and payment would work
hardship on the petitioner. Such a petition under 1 Minn. Stat. §
278.01 (1945) is entitled to a speedy trial, and with a minimum of
technicalities upon the claim, objections, or defenses made by the
petition .2 7 The district court has power to approve a compromise
or to set a lower valuation than that set forth in the offer by the
state,208 and to make a refund for overpayment.109 This procedure
is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court210 with no statutory
limitations as to the finality of the district court's findings of fact,
or of mixed law and fact. 21' Three difficulties appear in this proce-
dure as applied to mineral valuation cases, first the cost and com-
plexity of proof to both the taxpayer and the state under the usual
rules of evidence ;212 secondly, absence of provisions as to the effect
of the judgment as to subsequent rules of valuation selected by the
Commissioner of Taxation or assessors ;2113 and finally, its unavail-
ability to contest personal property taxes or valuations therefor.2 1 4
Because of the refund powers of the Commissioner of Taxation,
it is said that the taxpayer must exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing suit to collect back real property taxes illegally or
206. 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.03 (1945).
207. 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.05 (1945).
208. Ibid.
209. 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.12 (1945). This procedure seems to answer
part of the objections raised to inadequacy of remedies for illegally assessed
taxes in Note, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 692 (1931), but a costly trial and difficult
burden of proof as to over-valuation is still entailed. 'Cf. State v. Oliver
Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 385, 270 N. W. 609 (1936) (record of sb
volumes in the District Court; 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 279.17-.19 [1945]).
210. 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.13 (1945). If no appeal is taken, the judgment
is final and conclusive only as to the taxes involved in the petition.
211. Ibid.
212. See Pierce, Preparation of Valuation Cases, 25 Taxes 53 (1947)(federal tax practice but valid for state tax valuation cases); Note, Tax
Problems in the Valuation of Property, 25 Taxes 520 (1947) (also federal
tax) ; Hamburg, Tax Valuation of Real Estate, Stock and Good Will, 6
Institute of Fed. Tax. 145 (1948). The Minnesota courts have been liberal
in reception of expert opinion testimony and the use of statistical and eco-
nomic data. Cf. State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198 Minn. 395, 270 N. W.
614 (1936) (statutory requirement of non-technical trial; 1 Minn. Stat.§ 279.17 [1945]). But cf. American Bauxite Co. v. Board of Equalization,
119 Ark. 362, 177 S. W. 1151 (1915) (rejecting proof of capitalized earn-
ings valuation); Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. King County, 10
Wash. 2d 424, 116 P. 2d 827 (1941) ; State v. Federal Reserve Bank, 25 F.
Supp. 14 (D.C. Minn., 1938).
213. Cf. Village of Aurora v. Comm'r of Taxation, 217 Minn. 64, 14
N. W. 2d 292 (1944) (involving the same properties litigated in State v.
Oliver Iron Mining Co., supra note 212, but for a different year's taxes,
claiming the state had not followed the court method of valuation in the
earlier case).
214. 1 Minn. Stat. § 277.02 (1945). Cf. Land O'Lakes Creamery v.
Village of Sebeka, 225 Minn. 540, 31 N. W. 2d 660, 665 (1948).
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unjustly collected.2 "1 But a suit to recover illegally assessed per-
sonal property taxes is available,216 if there has been a payment
under protest; however, what is a payment under protest, or under
coercion, or the equivalent, must be litigated 217 in each case.
An established procedural method to secure more speedy relief
in tax cases is an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act,'2 1 adopted by Minnesota in 1933. The proceeding is analogous
to the power of the Court of Session in early Scotch law to issue
special declarations and later to give special equitable relief.2 1 The
United States Supreme Court early upheld validity of use of
declaratory judgments in state tax actions, 220 and has been followed
in this respect by the Minnesota Court.2 21 The requirements of an
action for a declaratory judgment were existence of adversary
interests and parties, a true justiciable issue between the parties,
and that the decision rendered will settle and determine the con-
troversy.2 22 Relief has been afforded the taxpayer under a con-
tention of double taxation on corporate excess of a foreign corpo-
ration as a question of power to tax.2"- And it has been used to
obtain construction of the income tax law.2 24 Relief has been
granted under the Declaratory Judgments Act where a classification
of tax was alleged unconstitutional, as an alternative remedy and
not an extraordinary remedy.225
But the use of the declaratory judgment as an alternative
215. Note, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 692 (1931). Whether this is also the
case where a claim of overvaluation will be barred because of failure to
exhaust admninistrative remedies is an open question. See notes 194 and
196 supra.
216. 1 Minn. Stat. § 277.04 (1945).
217. Oakland v. County of Ramsey, 98 Minn. 404, 108 N. W. 857
(1906) ; State v. Cudahy, 103 Minn. 419, 115 N. W. 645, 1039 (1906). See
Note, 11 Va. L. Rev. 134 (1924).
218. 2 Minn. Stat. §§ 555.01-.16 (1945). See Borchard, Uniform
Declaratorv Judgment Act, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 239 (1934); 19 Minn. L. Rev.
716 (1935).
219. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 125-28 (2 ed. 1941).
220. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933) (state
excise taxes on storage and distribution of gasoline).
221. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N. W. 102 (1934) (income
tax).
222. 2 Minn. Stat. §§ 555.11, 555.01 (1945). Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933); County Board of Education of St. Louis
County v. Borgen, 192 Minn. 512, 257 N. W. 92 (1934) (levy and collection
of taxes for schools; held not a justiciable controversy, the parties not
having adversary interests).
223. Bemis Bag Co. v. Wallace, 197 Minn. 216, 266 N. W. 690 (1936).
224. Hall Hardware Co. v. Gage, 197 Minn. 619, 268 N. W. 202 (1936).
The Board of Tax Appeals would seem the exclusive remedy now. Duluth-
Superior Dredging Co. v. Comm'r, 217 Minn. 346, 14 N. W. 2d 439 (1944).
225. See Leighton v. City of Minneapolis, 222 Minn. 516, 518, 25 N. W.
2d 263, 264 (1946).
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remedy was early limited by the Minnesota Court to situations
where other remedies were not well established nor working satis-
factorily so that if a taxpayer had another equitable or statutory
remedy that existing remedy must be used.2 2 6 And in the recent
case, Land 0' Lakes Dairy Co. v. Village of Sebeka,22 7 the Minne-
sota Court held that the remedy under the Declaratory Judghments
Act was not available to contest real property tax assessments or
levies, there being an adequate remedy under 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.01
(1945) to challenge the tax before levy; but that the Declaratory
Judgments Act is available to contest personal property taxes, the
normal statutory procedure being unsatisfactory.22 8
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts likewise may be precluded by
the failure of the Taxpayer to exhaust state remedies before com-
mencement of proceedings. 22 In determining which is the last step
in the state action for which judicial review is sought, it is im-
portant to distinguish between action that is void, therefore always
open to collateral attack, and action that is merely irregular or a
result of honest mistake which can properly be reviewed only upon
a direct appeal after the taxpayer has exhausted his state reme-
dies. Thus, the nature of the over-valuation, whether merely ir-
regularities of procedures, "33 whether based on a wrong principle,2 3-2
or whether fraudulent or deliberately discriminatory 33 may deter-
226. See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Billstein, 204 Minn. 224, 226,
283 N. W. 138, 140 (l93S).
227. 225 Minn. 540, 31 N. W. 2d 660 (1948).
228. The rather curious effect of this case on future mineral valuation
controversies may be to require the mining companies to institute a separate
defense for overvaluation of stock pile ore mined during months when
shipping is closed, although the same valuation method is used in assessing
it as for unmined ore reached by the real property tax period, and the valua-
tion method used for a stock pile could be tested by a petition for declara-
tory judgment, but the valuation used for the ore in the ground would be
subject to 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.01 (1945) or the uncertain administrative
procedures outlined above. The result in this case also seems contrary to the
trend of opinions which allow use of declaratory judgments for test of
assessments of real property taxes. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments
846 (2 ed. 1941) ; Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 873 (1949).
229. Greeley v. Weld County, 264 U. S. 450 (1924); Goldsmith v.
Standard Chemical Co. 23 F. 2d 313 (8th Cir. 1928). See 27 Mich. L. Rev.
109 (1928).
230. Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effects of Failure to
Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1930).
231. These normally are not open to collateral attack but must be
taken by direct review after exhaustion of administrative remedies and
statutory appeals.
232. No cases decide whether all administrative appeals and statutory
appeals must be exhausted prior to collateral attack. Direct attack after
exhaustion of state remedies seems the safer course.
233. These situations are open to collateral attack as void, so ad-
ministrative appeals normally need not be exhausted. Cummins v. Mer-
chants National Bank, 101 U. S. 153 (1879); Raymond v. Chicago Trac-
tion Co. 207 U. S. 20 (1907).
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mine the point at which the case will receive judicial review in
the Federal Courts, even if this is allowing the result to determine
the jurisdiction.2 3 4 And, the characterization of the state court's
action as part of an administrative procedure or as a final legal
remedy becomes important.2- 5 Probably the position of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in hearing appeals from either the Commissioner of
Taxation -2 36 or the Board of Tax Appeals 237 is as part of an ad-
ministrative process; whereas in connection with objections at law
to collection or assessment of taxes, the appeals are final statutory
court action.2 - 8
The chief bar to original equity jurisdiction of the federal dis-
trict courts over state tax matters is Section 24(1) of the Judicial
Code which after 1937 provided:
".... no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to en-
join, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any
tax imposed by or pursuant to the laws of any state where a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the
courts of such states.
'239
The appropriate procedure to contest constitutionality of taxing
action now is resort to the highest state court and then appeal
to the United States Supreme Court rather than bringing suit in
the Federal District Court..2 40 The restrictions on equitable relief
in a Federal District Court have been extended to apply to actions
for a declaratory judgment 241 under the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act,242 the reason being given that the Supreme Court will
pay scrupulous regard to the the independence of state governments
and their fiscal operations. However, federal courts have taken
234. But cf. operation of the Johnson Act, 50 Stat. 738 (1937); 28
U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1946), notes 240, 241 in ra.
235. Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effects of Failure to
Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1930).
236. 1 Minn. Stat. § 270.26 (1945).
237. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.10 (1945) ; see text to note 256 infra.
238. 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.13 (1945).
239. 50 Stat. 738 (1937) ; 28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1946) (The Johnson
Act), as amended, 62 Stat. 932, 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
240. See In re New York, S. & W. Ry. Co., 36 F. Supp. 158 (D.C. N.J.
1940). Cf. Phipps v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 111 F. 2d 393 (3d Cir. 1940) ;
Baker v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 106 F. 2d 525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied.
308 U. S. 620 (1939); Whitmore v. Bu. of Rev. of New Mexico, 64 F.
Supp. 911 (D.C. Mex.), aff'd, 329 U. S. 668 (1946).
241. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293(1943); Hillsborough Township, N. J. v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 621 (1946) :
West Pub. Co. v. McColgan, 138 F. 2d 320 (9th Cir. 1943). See note, 149
A. L. R. 1094, 1103 (1944); Note, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 643 (1941); Note,
50 Yale L. J. 927 (1941).
242. 48 Stat. 955 (1934), 49 Stat. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. § 400
(1946), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202 (Cong. Serv. 1948). See
Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944).
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non-tax cases on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and the
amount in controversy being more than $3,000.243
The rigorous procedure to reach the Minnesota Supreme Court
in valuation and assessment cases is not alleviated by the doubts
which may arise as to the alternative remedies to be used before
state courts or administrative agencies. Relief in Federal Courts,
to the extent it depends on exhaustion of remedies before state
tribunals, is equally perilous and unsatisfactory. The Minnesota
taxpayer who undertakes a contest of mineral property tax valua-
tions faces an arduous and costly struggle, with the consolation
that if he wins in the state court he may be forced to begin all over
again when the next year's tax bill is presented. But his problems
are not yet ended.
C. judicial Review of the Minnesota Board of Tax Appeals-
Administrative Finality of Tax Valuations
In reorganization of the Minnesota Department of Taxation
in 1939, a board of tax appeals was created within the department,
but independent of it.244 The board is said to function as an admin-
istrative "clearing-house" between the department of taxation and
the courts. -" The reasons for its creation are said to be similar to
the purposes of the federal Tax Court, namely: to relieve the tax-
payer of the hardship of paying a tax before contesting the assess-
ment, to relieve the courts of the burden of tax litigation, and to
avoid overloading the Supreme Court with reviewing the mass
of evidence usually submitted before an expert board dealing with
technical details. 4
6
The jurisdiction of the board is appellate, "to review and re-
determine orders or decisions of the commissioner of taxation.' ' 247
243. Pure Oil Co. v. Petrolite Corp., 58 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Texas),
cert. denied, 330 U. S. 834 (1947) ; Lucas v. City of Charlotte, 86 F. 2d
394 (4th Cir. 1936) ; See 109 A. L. R. 297, 300 (1937).
244. Minn. Laws 1939, c. 431, art. 6, § 10; 1 'Minn. Stat. § 271.01(1945).
245. See Village of Aurora v. Commissioner, 217 Minn. 64, 74, 14 N. W.
2d 292, 300 (1944). The concept of a "clearing-house" may envisage the
Supreme Court as part of an administrative process of which certiorari to it
is the logical conclusion. If the primary jurisdiction rule is applied this
would be important in determining whether a taxpayer has exhausted his
administrative remedies before appeals to a state district court under the
procedure in I Minn. Stat. § 270.17 (1945) (appeal from assessment), or to
the supreme court from the commissioner of taxation under I Minn. Stat.§ 270.22 (1945). The Aurora Case, supra, throws doubt on the availability
of either of these procedures if a municipality contests.
246. Village of Aurora v. Commissioner, 217 2%inn. 64, 75, 14 N. W. 2d
292, 301 (1944).
247. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.05 (1945).
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An appeal from an order of the commissioner may be brought by
the state's attorney-general, a taxpayer or municipality ;248 and each
appeal is heard de novo upon issues made by the notice of appeal
and answer; but the appealing party must meet a presumption
that the order of commissioner is "prima facie" valid.'- 49 The
statute sets out detailed provisions for hearings, notice pleadings,
transcript of testimony, and entry of a final order giving reasons
for the decision.2 50
Creation of the board raised immediate problems of the finality
of administrative review of tax assessments. The primary question
of scope of judicial review of the board's decisions the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered in 1944,251 holding the board has
broad powers of finality of decision of both fact and law. Basing its
views on the words of the statute252 and Dobson v. Commissioner,-2 5 3
the court extended its earlier decisions254 which had established the
finality of administrative findings in the traditional area of fact.
But the distinction between "fact" and "law" in property and
occupation tax valuation cases and the degree to which Dobson v.
Commissioner will be followed remain to be explored.
The reorganization statute is explicit 255 in its provisions for
248. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.06 (1) (1945). The provision for appeal
by any "political subdivisions of the state, directly or indirectly interested
therein or affected thereby . . ." indicates the adversary nature of the pro-
ceeding before the Minnesota Board of Tax Appeals and perhaps distinguishes
it from proceedings before the federal Tax Court. This provision is found
in property tax procedure of a few other states which also have a Board of
Tax Appeals. Cf. N. J. Stat. Ann. § 54:2-34 (Supp. 1949) (Division of Tax
Appeals hears appeals by counties and municipalities); Ohio Gen. Code
Ann. §§ 1464-1 (5), 5610 (1946) (Board of Tax Appeals can hear county
determinations and local officers). But see Mass. Ann. Laws c. 58A, § 6
(1945).
249. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.11 (1945). See State v. Trask, 167 Minn.
304, 306. 209 N. W. 18, 19 (1926).
250. 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 271.06-.08 (1945).
251. Village of Aurora v. Commissioner of Taxation, 217 Minn. 64,
14 N. V. 2d 292 (1944).
252. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.10 (1945).
253. 320 U. S. 489 (1944).
254. State ex rel. Interstate Iron Co. v. Armson, 166 Minn. 230, 207
N. W. 727 (1926); Cargill, Inc. v. Spaeth, 215 Minn. 540, 10 N. V. 2d
728 (1943) (income tax).
255. Most statutes, if they provide for state-wide administrative review
of assessments, are silent on the scope of judicial review thereafter. Culp,
Admi ;istrative Remedies in the Assessment and Enforcement of State Taxes.
17 N. C. L. Rev. 118, 130 (1939). Cf. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 58A, 13 (1945)
(procedure of review established but not the scope); N. J. Stat. Ann. §
54:4-62 (1940) (general judicial review of all tax assessments and deter-
minations with court power to redetermine assessment. No specific review of
Division of Tax Appeals) ; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 1464 (1946) (no pro-
vision for judicial review).
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judicial review by the state supreme court upon writ of certiorari
from any final order of the BTA :216
"Such review may be had on the ground that the board was without
jurisdiction, that the order of the board was not justified by the
evidence or was not in comformity with law, or that the board
committed any other error of law."
At the outset the burden is on the aggrieved party to show in what
particulars the order was not supported by the findings or the
findings were not justified by the evidence ;257 there is an added
presumption in tax assessment cases that the administrative find-
ings are fair and impartial.
2 5 -8
In examining a statutory limitation of review of evidence the
courts are apt to look to the meaning intended by the legislature and
prevailing judicial interpretations of the term.2 9 No settled defini-
tions or judicial interpretations have been found for the words
"justified by the evidence."' 0 Decisions of the Minnesota court
before establishment of the BTA show that review of administrative
agencies generally,2 61 and especially review of administrative tax
valuations, in the absence of statutory requirements, embrace a
wide range of evidential standards required before the court will
set aside the findings: (1) a "gross" mistake in fact,28 2 (2)
whether there was "any" evidence to support the decision, 26 3 (3) a
requirement of "substantial" evidence,264 (4) whether the evidence
was such that the agency might "reasonably make the order.
-2 65
256. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.10 (1945).
257. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.11 (1945) .... the order of the board of tax
appeals ... shall be prima facie evidence of all facts stated therein ....
258. Ibid: ". . . and shall be prima facie evidence that all precedent
requirements of the law were complied with. . . ." Read with 1 Minn. Stat.
§ 272.06 (1945) (legality of form and substance presumed).
259. Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 1026 (1941).
260. "Justified, meaning done on adequate reasons sufficiently supported
by credible evidence when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by
common sense and by correct rules of law . . .", as defined in Selectmen of
Wakefield v. Judge of First District Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass.
477, 160 N. E. 427 (1928) (italics added) (statutory standard of judicial
review of town administrative removal of police officers). If read literally, the
phrase "justified by the evidence" seems to require a full examination of
evidence underlying the order.
261. State v. Great Northern Ry., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N. W. 247 (1915).
262. State v. London & Northwest Am. Mortgage Co., 80 Minn. 277,
83 N. W. 339 (1900).
263. State cx rel. City of Ely v. Minnesota Tax Comm'n, 137 Minn.
20, 162 N. W. 675 (1917).
264. State v. Great Northern Ry., 135 Minn. 19, 159 N. W. 1089
(1916) ; see Note, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 68 (1938).
265. State ex rel. Inter-State Iron Co. v. Armson, 166 Minn. 230, 207
N. W. 727 (1926).
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Since no uniform or clear meanings can be attached to these
words, 66 the selection of a particular standard of evidence on re-
view becomes a problem of judicial policy.267 In absence of an articu-
late legislative purpose in the statute or during its enactment,"6 9 the
court must resort to its own notions of the relations between the
administrative agency and courts.
Administrative finality has been extended in recent years in
both federal and state courts by widening the pigeonhole of
"fact. ' 26 9 The doctrine of "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" ques-
tion of fact has been a controversial limitation on the exercise of a
court's independent judgment on facts or on evidence behind admin-
istrative findings.2 7 0 If an issue of confiscation of property is in-
volved,2 7 1 the duty of the appellate court is to exercise independent
judgment on the facts presented by the record'.2 7 Tax valuations
have been held confiscatory in a period of great depression and the
underlying evidence opened to a constitutional fact type of exami-
nation without a showing of discrimination or lack of uniformity.
2 73
But the usual holding is that due process is not violated by giving
administrative finality to determinations of value made for pur-
266. Note, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 68 (1938).
267. Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 1026 (1941).
268. According to a letter from the Revisor of Statutes, State of
Minnesota, no preliminary or later report was published for the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1939. The bill was drafted in the Attorney General's office from
data prepared by the Minnesota Institute of Governmental Research, Inc.
The act received "cursory" examination in the legislative committees since
it was presented late in the session.
269. E.g., FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 (1934); NLRB
v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 (1939) ; State cX
rel. Interstate Air Parts Inc. v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 223 Minn.
187, 25 N. W. 2d 718 (1947).
270. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287
(1920) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
But cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944) (consequences
of a rate order supersedes valuation as basis for judicial review). The
confiscation issue is reopened again, however, in New York v. United
States, 331 U. S. 284 (1947).
271. But see St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 73
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring opinion).
272. Ibid: recent rate order cases show a tendency of the United
States Supreme Court to return to a closer examination of the evidence
supporting administrative fact findings. ICC v. Mechling, 330 U. S. 567
(1947) ; New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284 (1947). This is especially
true where the commission is split as to the effect of the evidence. See id. at
355 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
273. Great Northern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. 135 (1936). This case
has been sharply limited to its facts by later decisions and is no longer
authority for the notion of "substantive" due process. But relief in federal
courts from state taxing action has been rendered even more difficult under
50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1946) which deprives a federal
district court of equity jurisdiction if sufficient remedy is available at law
or equity in a state court. See note 239 supra.
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poses of the general property tax.24 Underlying this treatment of
all tax assessments as "ordinary" non-reviewable fact is an assump-
tion that the courts should limit their corrective power over the
valuations of real and personal property.275 The basic issue is the
degree to which the appellate courts should avoid review on the
merits of administrative orders or findings which are contested
as beyond the limits of constitutional authority.
278
In absence of discrimination and confiscation, state277 and
federal courts27 8 may decide that an administrative determination
of value is a non-reviewable finding of fact. However, this over-
looks that most assessments involve the application of an uncertain
and vague statutory standard of cash value or market value, e.g.,
"All property shall be assessed at its true and full value in
money." 270I One writer has expressed the opinion that an assess-
ment for a property tax is "at least a mixed question of law and
fact on which the taxpayer should be entitled in fairness to a thor-
ough hearing, preferably by a tribunal other than that which made
the assessment originally." 280 Thus, if the Minnesota Board of Tax
Appeals is applying a specific administratively determined standard
of valuation in a de novo hearing in which it can raise, lower, or
affirm the assessment, it would seem both the criteria used for
valuation and their application should in fairness be at least a
"mixed question" subject to review by the appellate court.2 1 Ac-
cording to yet another view, the selection of factors considered
by the board in its determinations of value and the weight to be
attached to the various factors are purely "questions of law."2
82
Indiscriminate lumping criteria of valuation into a non-reviewable
274. E.g., Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321 (1885) ; King
v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404, 429-31 (1898) ; Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930) ; Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Martin, 100 F. 2d
139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 651 (1938).
275. But see State v. London & Northwest Am. Mortgage Co., 80
Minn. 277, 286, 83 N. W. 339, 341 (1900) (duty of courts to maintain a
"substantial and effective corrective power over the valuations of real and
personal property").
276. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38,
52 (1936).
277. Culp, supra note 255, at 129, 130.
278. Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 293 U. S. 102 (1934).
279. 2 Minn. Stat. § 373.11 (1945).
280. Culp, supra note 255, at 118, 129. The court thereby dodges
analysis of the method of valuation. Compare text to notes 140-144 supra.
281. Accord, Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 Harv. L.
Rev. 899, 909-11 (1943). Cf. Paul, Dobson z. Conzinissioner: the Strange
Wlays of Law and Fact, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 753, 837, 838 (1944).




category of "fact" seems an unsatisfying method, by which the
review of the agency by the court is limited.
The scope of review of the Minnesota Board of Tax Appeals in
property valuation cases was first established in Village of Aurora
v. Commissioner of Taxation. s28 3 In that case the court held the
selection and application of non-statutory deduction factors to
arrive at net valuation of mineral properties were questions of fact,
limiting itself to deciding whether evidence was such that the board
might "reasonably make the order or determination in question."
The court examined and rejected statutory standards of "fair,
voluntary sale for cash, ' 2 4 and approved an administratively deter-
mined standard of value as established by men "acquainted with the
lands, their adaptability for use, and the circumstances of the sur-
rounding community. ' 28 5 In effect the court extended finality of
administrative findings of fact to include the selection of the criteria
of valuation: "In the final analysis it was for the board to use
its independent judgment, based on all the testimony, in deter-
mining the issue of undervaluation . . ." citing Dobson v,. Com-
missioner.2s6 The Dobson rule stated that decisions of the federal
Tax Court can be reversed only if the reviewing court can
identify a clear-cut mistake of law3 87 The reasoning of both the
Minnesota court and the United States Supreme Court was
founded on the presumed expertness of the BTA, and a desire to
obtain uniformity of decision.2 88 In later (1944) tax cases the Min-
283. 217 Minn. 64, 14 N. W. 2d 292 (1944).
284. This is the vague statutory standard laid down for the valuation
of mineral property. 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 273.11, 273.12 (1945).
285. Village of Aurora v. Commissioner of Taxation, 217 Minn. 64,
80, 14 N. W. 2d 292, 302 (1944). But cf. State v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 198
Minn. 385, 270 N. W. 609 (1936) (court selection of standard of valuation
and deduction criteria based on expert testimony and a capitalized earnings
substitute for "market value").
286. 320 U. S. 489 (1944). Compare Ecker v. Western Pacific Ry.,
318 U. S. 448, 475 (1943) (Reed, J., Ry. reorganization valuations). But cf.
Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. Ry., 318 U. S. 523,
561-564, 577 (1943) (notice the statutory valuation standards in these re-
organization cases).
287. Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 448 (1947). See Paul, supra note 281 for
an exhaustive analysis and criticism of this decision.
288. Expertness-The Minnesota BTA is called upon to decide a wider
range of specialized questions than the Tax Court, and under virtually non-
existent property and occupation tax statutory standard. Since its incention,
the Minnesota Board has decided cases dealing chiefly with income and cor-
poration privilege taxes, but many cases deal with such unrelated matters as
procedure before the commissioner of taxation, general property tax,
exemptions, listing and assessment, classification, gift taxes, inheritance taxes.
sleeping car and freight line company gross earnings taxes, and miscellaneous
occupation taxes. The presumption of expertness seems to be weakened also
where the board is split on its findings, as it was in Village of Aurora v.
Comm'n of Taxation, 217 Mfinn. 64, 14 N. W. 2d 292 (1944) (2-1). See New
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nesota court stated that "the decision will not be disturbed if it has
any reasonable basis in law, ''2 D8 thus making clear its acceptance
of the full extension of the Dobson rule.
In attempting to apply the Dobson rule, subsequent federal cases
indicate that reviewable "questions of law" include Tax Court
selection of controlling rules in tax cases in the absence of statutory
standards, and the initial interpretation of statutes.200 Questions of
general lawv*11 and matters of procedure - 2 are also reviewable as
"law." And administrative interpretation of detailed provisions of
tax statutes have been considered reviewable in many U. S. circuit
courts since the Dobson rule.2 93 Few circuits have gone as far as
York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 355 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
Uiformty--The Dobson rule led to confusion and uncertainty in lower
courts, perhaps as a result of the peculiar structure of the Tax Court and
its bifurcated review. Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 448 (1947) ; Griswold, The
Nreed for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1173 (1944).
Paul, supra note 281, at 845-47 points out the effect of the coexistence of
two administrative agencies within the same area, e.g., the Commissioner of
Taxation and the BTA in the instant case. Each may arrive at a different
interpretation of the statute. In property tax assessments there are not tvo
but as many as seven separate agencies that may have individual interpreta-
tions of a rule. A recent study emphasizes the effect in Minnesota of having
2,600 local assessors, largely unregulated and unsupervised, on attempts at
equalizing the general property tax. See Minn. Resources Comm'n, Eco-
nomic Analysis of the State of Minnesota 55-56 (1945) (based on a study
by the J. G. White Engineering Corp., N. Y.). It is submitted counsel for
taxpayers and municipalities may be quite as confused by the Aurora rule as
federal courts have been under the Dobson decision. It is significant that
since 1944 no property valuation cases have been reported through the BTA
to the Minnesota Supreme Court. (Period 1944 through December, 1949,
inclusive.)
289. Village of Hibbing v. Comm'r, 217 Minn. 528, 14 N. W. 2d 923
(1944) (property tax exemption) ; accord, Duluth-Superior Dredging Co. v.
Comm'r, 217 Minn. 346, 14 N. W. 2d 439 (1944) (income tax; follows and
cites the Aurora case, supra note 288, although the latter involved quite
different problems of construction of the income tax regulations). Cf. Trust
of Bingham v. Comm'r, 325 U. S. 365 (1945). The situation in John Kelley
Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U. S. 521 (1946) has not yet arisen before the Minne-
sota Court, although conceivably it could, originating simultaneously from
the district court under 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.01 (1945) and from the BTA.
290. E.g., Trust of Bingham v. Comm'r, 325 U. S. 365 (1945) ; Beulah
B. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U. S. 1 (1947) (Tax Court's determination that
"property" means "equity" and that the amount of mortgage is not the
measure of benefit realized, announced ruleg of general applicability on
clear-cut questions of law.) (Dissent based on Dobson rule.) ; McWilliams
v. Comm'r, 331 U. S. 694 (1947): Comm'r v. Security-First National Bank,
148 F. 2d 937 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Comm'r v. Clarion Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 671
(App. D.C.), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 883 (1945) ; Slough v. Comm'r, 147 F. 2d
836 (6th Cir. 1945). But cf. Duluth-Superior Dredging Co. v. Comm'r, 217
Minn. 346, 14 N. W. 2d 439 (1944).
291. McCullough v. Comm'r, 153 F. 2d 345 (2d Cir. 1946); Dumont's
Estate v. Comm'r. 150 F. 2d 691 (3d Cir. 1945).
292. Maxfield v. Comm'r, 153 F. 2d 325 (9th Cir. 1946); Fisher v.
Comm'r, 149 F. 2d 540 (7th Cir. 1945).
293. See note 290 supra.
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the Minnesota Court in holding that the reviewing court's duty is
confined to deciding whether the board's interpretation of the tax
statute was reasonable.2 9 4 And the Dobson rule has caused con-
siderable confusion in the United States Supreme Court and espe-
cially in the federal circuit courts. 29 5 The result of such agitation
was a proposal in Congress to eliminate the Dobson rule by statu-
tory amendment of the Internal Revenue Code.290 Section 1141 (a)
was amended, having the effect of giving federal appellate courts
the same power over Tax Court decisions as they have in review of
decisions of the federal district courts, in cases tried without a
jury.297 This Congressional overruling of the Dobson decision
would seem to remove the halo of Supreme Court authority from
finality of BTA decisions before the Minnesota Court. It is sub-
mitted that the Minnesota Court should abandon the strict posi-
tion announced in the Aurora case, in its place exercising dis-
cretion on each case as it comes up whether to grant certiorari, and
amending the Rules of Practice 2 9  to set forth conditions under
which a full review will be given as is now done for workman's
compensation and labor dispute cases.2
99
The "Iaw..-"fact" distinction is especially difficult to apply with
any predictable accuracy,300 there being no working definition of
either law or fact valid even in a restricted context, about which
there is reasonable certainty subsequent reviewing tribunals may
agree. This is more apparent if the arbitrary classification as "fact"
294. Kirchenbaum v. Comm'r, 155 F. 2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U. S. 726 (1946); Brooklyn National Corp. v. Comm'r, 157 F. 2d 450
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 733 (1946). Cf. Duluth-Superior Dredging
Co. v. Comm'r, 217 Minn. 346, 14 N. W. 2d 439 (1944).
295. Compare "Uniformity" note 288 supra.
296. Letter, Undersecretary of Treasury to the Chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee, Feb. 26, 1948 (Technical Tax Revisions Recom-
mended for 1948; Item 45 recommended elimination of the Dobson rule).
Magill Report (Nov., 1947). Cf. H. F. 340 Minnesota Legislature, 1945;
Minn. Jud. Council Report, Special Committee on Unification of the Courts,
Item 4, p. 5, 8 (1942).
297. 48 Stat. 926, 26 U. S. C. § 1141 (a) (1946), as amended 62 Stat.
991 (1948), 26 U. S. C. § 1141(a) (Supp. 1949). Cf. Wright-Bernet, Inc. v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 172 F. 2d 343 (6th Cir. 1949) ; MacManus v.
Comm'r, 172 F. 2d 697 (6th Cir. 1949) ; Comm'r v. Cardeza, 173 F. 2d 19
(3d Cir. 1949) ; Grace Bros. Inc. v. Comm'r, 173 F. 2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949)(adopting an equity review).
298. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.10 (2) (1945) "... and the matter shall be
heard and determined by the court as in other certiorari cases, subject to
the provisions hereof and to such rules as the court may provide for cases
arising hereunder." (Italics added).
299. Rules of Practice, Sup. Ct. of Minn., Rules III, XII (1947).




or "law" is used as a substitute for judicial analysis301 on the merits
of cases involving mixed law and fact.
No one rationale for justifying finality of administrative deter-
minations is widely accepted,' 02 by the writers or by the courts.
Various theories have been proposed; e.g.: (1) that characteriza-
tion as a non-reviewable "question of fact" is essentially a belief in
the quality of expertness of the particular administrative tribunal,
whereas a "question of law" is found where the appellate court de-
cides it is equipped to handle the question.3 " The difficulty with this
pragmatic approach is that it offers no better predictability than the
traditional law-fact dichotomy.30 4 (2) That the scope of review
in state property taxation is a matter of policy of the court in
absence of an effective statute.30  But this leaves unexplained the
important question of the reasons for determining policy. (3) That
more intensive review will be given if the fact situation would lead
to a decision of "general applicability." 30 6 The third seems a
workable theory but formulates no basic guide for establishing the
relation between courts and administrative tribunals. (4) That the
judiciary cannot interfere with executive or legislative branches
of government under various constitutional clauses concerning
separation of powers, express or implied, 0 7 although this explana-
tion seems to have gone out of fashion.
In absence of general agreement among courts or commentators
as to the reasons justifying the "fact" or "law" distinction as an
explanation of finality of administrative decisions about property
value, it is submitted certain premises should be articulated by an
appellate court in establishing precedents of review of administrative
tax courts where the controlling review or valuation statute is silent
or ambiguous. Expertness of the agency or board should be con-
301. It has been suggested that the classification is used to allow courts
more freedom to distinguish between degrees of expertness of agencies,
types of action, and hard factual situations. Jaffe, Administrative Procedure
Reexamined: The Benjamin Report, 56 Hare. L. Rev. 704, 730 (1943).
302. Expertness seems the chief ground. Paul, supra note 281 at 841-49.
But cf. note 288 supra.
303. Landis, The Administrative Process 152 (1938).
304. Brown, supra note 281, at 922.
305. Culp, supra note 255, at 118, 129 (judicial review of appellate ad-
ministrative tribunals).
306. Note, 60 Hare. L. Rev. 448 (1947). Cf. Trust of Bingham v.
Comm'r, 325 U. S. 365, 370 (1945).
307. Note, 50 W. Va. L. Q. 75, 87 (1947); But cf. State v. Minn. &
Ontario Power Co., 121 Minn. 421, 141 N. W. 839 (1913) ; State v. Koochi-
ching Realty Co., 146 Minn. 87, 177 N. W. 940 (1920) ; See Cooke v. Iver-
son, 108 Minn. 388, 122 N. V. 251 (1909); State ex rel. Laurisch v. Pohl,
214 Minn. 221, 8 N. W. 2d 227 (1943) (mandamus). See Pound, Law and
the State-Jursprudence and Politics, 57 Hare. L. Rev. 1193, 1227-1230
(1944).
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sidered in the light of the training, experience and specialized
knowledge of the individual members, perhaps applying the kinds
of tests used to qualify expert witnesses. 08 A presumption of expert-
ness concerning income tax matters may be unconvincing as ap-
plied to an economist's and engineer's function of mineral property
valuation; thus a reviewing court's discussion of expertness should
relate the expert's qualifications to the subject-matter being reviewed.
A second step in judicial analysis, it is submitted, should be an
express balancing of interests between the urgency of needs of gov-
ernment for income, as weighed against the position of the indi-
vidual taxpayer if denied effective court supervision of the selec-
tion and administration of standards of assessment and valuation.
To the extent that administrative findings impliedly contain a
selection of standards of valuation310 there is an exercise of legis-
lative power which, like any legislation involved in a justiciable
controversy, should be subject to examination by courts on each
application in a fact situation likely to reoccur in the future. 311
Finally, the interests of orderly administration require judicial
supervision of the degree to which standards of valuation are
followed by the taxing authorities as to procedure, uniformity, and
matters requiring application of general law. 12 However, to expect
independent judicial re-determination of each finding of fact in an
administrative decision applying a judicially approved standard of
valuation would be to disregard fifteen years of development of
the finality doctrine in both state and federal courts; it would also
result in further confusion of the tax valuation procedure. It is sug-
gested here the review of findings of the Minnesota Board of Tax
Appeals should be wider than indicated by the Aurora case, and that
1 Minn. Stat. § 271.10 (1945) need not be amended to achieve that
result.313 The recent case of Stronge & Lightener v. Coimtis-
sioner,31 4 decided April, 1949, confirms this opinion as to income tax
matters, and returns the scope of review over decisions of the BTA
to a sound statutory basis.
308. See note 288 supra. See A. L. I., Model Code of Evidence, Rules
402, 409 (1942).
309. Compare note 288 supra.
310. See note 327 supra.
311. Compare note 288 supra, with note 308.
312. This is best illustrated by the development of the Dobson rule
in the circuit courts since that decision. Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 448 (1947)
26 U. S. C. § 1141(a) (Supp. 1949).
313. Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry., 69 Minn. 353, 376, 72 N. V. 713
(1915). But cf. Hoshour, Legislation Concenzing the Scope of Judicial
Review of Administrative Process, 29 Minn. L. Rev. 157, 180, 185 (1945).




1. The capitalized future earnings computation used for taxa-
tion of iron ore in Minnesota is a maximum valuation, having
only an indirect relation to "market value" or "ordinary value," that
is, what the property would bring if sold or rented. There is serious
doubt as to the power of the state to include extraterritorial elements
in a valuation formula used as a basis for an ad valorem tax on
mineral property. The Lake Erie price, integrated transportation
systems, and ore sales organizations should be excluded as factors in
the Minnesota calculation. Selection of interest rates used in the
Hoskold formula should reflect the cyclical nature of demands for
iron ore and steel products. An adequate discounting for hazards
of market and competition of foreign ores ought to be introduced to
return the valuation to a local situs in terms of cash value within pre-
scribed territorial taxing units as of the tax date.
2. Present methods of mineral taxation are thought to weaken
the competitive position of undeveloped low grade ores by heavy
depression property taxes and by the uncertainty of rates and ad-
ministration. Capitalized future earnings valuations create an ac-
crued tax burden on inactive and reserve properties which a small
operator could not assume without excessive long-term capital in-
vestment. Consequently, the capitalized future earnings valuations
and multiple taxes based on those valuations should be replaced by a
single tax which levies once on the current output of the mines..Y1
3. If such an apportioned gross earnings or unit output tax
shared with the local communities affected is not politically feasible,
then a satisfactory mineral property valuation and uniform account-
ing statute should be adopted in place of the capitalized future earn-
ings computations now used under ambiguous and general valua-
tion statutes. Such a revised valuation statute could be patterned
after the present Federal income tax regulations governing values
used as a basis for depletion, providing adequate depletion allow-
ances. Valuation methods used should include other factors with
the capitalized future earnings calculations. Class groupings of ore
properties should be eliminated in the property tax valuations to
encourage any possible future small operators.
4. If neither a single current output tax nor a detailed mineral
property valuation act can be adopted, then questions of valua-
315. A constitutional amendment may be necessary as to the occupation
tax. Art. IX, § 14. The legislature could, however, reduce the rate to a
nominal sum and introduce a tonnage tax, achieving the same result.
19501
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tion and assessment should be placed under effective judicial super-
vision. The uncertainties surrounding present administrative
remedies should be clarified, and a simple three-step complaint
procedure made available. Thus valuations could be established by
one local assessing agency with an appeal to the commissioner of
taxation and board of tax appeals in one hearing, then to the same
district court which would normally hear the objections to the real
property tax under 1 Minn. Stat. § 278.01 (1945) ; and ultimately
to the Supreme Court if an important question of law or law and
fact is raised in the district court.
5. Decisions of the state district courts and board of tax
appeals on principles of mineral valuations should be binding on
other like situated property and not a decision merely as to the one
year's tax bill for the properties litigated.
6. With Congressional disapproval of the Dobson rule, the
Minnesota Court should grant a wider scope of review to the deci-
sions of the board of tax appeals in mineral valuation cases, without
amendment of present statutes, specifying the situations wherein
the board is expert and the kind of conditions to surround the review.
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